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ABSTRACT 
A naval vessel’s “availability” is a scheduled period of time, normally conducted in a 
shipyard, to perform maintenance on and modernization of the vessel and its systems. 
The four public naval shipyards are continually challenged to complete depot-level, CNO 
availabilities on schedule. A naval vessel’s late return to the fleet results in the decrease 
in operational readiness due to the reduced number of operational days available for these 
vessels. Subject-matter experts hypothesize that factors such as inadequate planning for 
resources, quantity of overtime, and quantity of work stoppages experienced contribute to 
availability lateness. Data collected by the shipyards are analyzed to investigate factors 
influencing late completion of availabilities. The analysis suggests that carrier 
availabilities tend to finish on schedule more often than submarine availabilities; timely 
availabilities tend to have a higher cost performance ratio than late availabilities; late 
availabilities tend to charge less for work per month in man-days than the budgeted 
amount of planned work; and availabilities that finish on schedule tend to have fewer 
work stoppages prior to start of the availability than the later completing ones. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
This research explores various factors affecting the late completion of CNO availabilities. 
Availabilities are defined as the time when U.S. naval vessels are made available to 
maintenance activities for the accomplishment of maintenance and alterations. Timely 
completion of these maintenance and alteration projects is vital to maximizing fleet 
operational readiness and preventing cost overruns. Subject-matter experts hypothesize 
some factors that may contribute to availability lateness, such as: 
• Inadequate planning for and availability of resources 
• Underestimation of new work added to the initial work package 
• Excessive quantity of over-time 
• Excessive amounts of work stoppages preventing adherence to the planned 
schedule 
Data collected by the shipyards are analyzed to identify factors contributing to 
late completion of availabilities. 
The scope of this study covers availabilities pertaining to maintenance and 
alteration projects conducted on following naval vessel hulls: CVN 68, SSN 688, 
SSBN/SSGN 726, SSN 21, SSN 774, and LHD 1 class ships. 
The lessons gained from this study offer areas for further research and 
investigation. The results are as follows:  
• Carrier availabilities finish on schedule more often than submarine 
availabilities (Chapter III, Section C) 
• Timely availabilities tend to have a higher cost performance ratio than late 
availabilities (Chapter III, Section D) 
• Short submarine availabilities of fewer than 200 days are more likely to 
possess a greater number of days late as a percentage of planned length 
than longer availabilities (Chapter III, Section F) 
• No clear association exists between availability lateness and the number of 
simultaneous availabilities underway in a shipyard (Chapter III, Section 
G) 
 xvi
• The number of days late as a percentage of planned length of an 
availability appears to be decreasing at most shipyards after 2006 (Chapter 
III, Section G) 
• No clear association exists between submarine availability lateness and the 
number of concurrent carrier availabilities (Chapter III, Section I) 
• Late availabilities tend to charge less for work per month in man-days than 
the budgeted amount of planned work, whereas timely availabilities tend 
to charge more for work per month in man-days than the budgeted amount 
of planned work (Chapter III, Section J) 
• No clear association exists between the quantity (Chapter V, Section D) or 
duration (Chapter V, Section C) of work stoppages during an availability 
and availability lateness 
• Availabilities that finish on schedule tend to have fewer work stoppages 
prior to availability start than late availabilities (Chapter V, Section E) 
The thesis begins with a top-level data analysis to gain perspective on shipyard 
performance of the four Navy-owned shipyards located in Norfolk, Pearl Harbor, 
Portmouth, and Puget Sound. Lateness statistics of carrier and submarine availabilities 
are compared; the cost performance metric for late and timely availabilities are also 
compared. To explore possible associations with availability lateness, lateness statistics 
are computed for: availabilities of different scheduled lengths, availabilities conducted 
with differing numbers of simultaneous availabilities underway in the shipyard, 
availabilities completed in contiguous three year time periods during the years 2003 to 
2011, and also for availabilities with various durations in inclement weather months. 
Additionally, the possibility of an association between submarine availability lateness 
and the number of simultaneous carrier availabilities underway at Puget Sound Naval 
Shipyard is investigated. Finally, an analysis of the historical, top-level data compares the 
estimate of charged time spent in completing project work (actual quantity of work 
performed) per month with the estimated scheduled time spent to complete project work 
(budgeted quantity of work performed) per month for both late and timely availabilities. 
Analysis of work stoppage data investigates the effect unplanned delays, known 
as work stoppages, have on availability lateness. The availability’s management team 
submits work stoppages, categorized by eight different reasons, if the planned work for a 
job is unable to continue. The work stoppage data are summarized in three ways in order 
 xvii
to display commonalities and identify trends in work stoppages that are associated with 
availability lateness. The first two summaries organize the work stoppage data based on 
the mean length per work stoppage and the number of work stoppages submitted per 
work stoppage reason. The last summary organizes work stoppages based on the time-in-
availability of work stoppage submissions.  
Expansion of this research and further in-depth studies are necessary to truly 
understand the availability dynamic in regard to shipyard performance. This research, 
along with its recommendations for future and continuing studies, can assist NAVSEA 
and the naval shipyards leadership in understanding factors contributing to on-time and 
late availabilities. In addition, this research identifies factors associated with schedule 
lateness. 
 xviii
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Naval vessel maintenance and modernization is a necessary, reoccurring process 
to prevent decline in a vessel’s operational readiness. These maintenance periods, known 
as “availabilities,” are scheduled throughout a vessel’s operational life and conducted pier 
side or in dry-dock. Specifically, availabilities scheduled at the highest operational level 
and conducted in the naval shipyards, are called Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) 
availabilities. Schedule management of an availability is critical in ensuring the required 
maintenance and modernization work is completed on time; that is, before or on the 
scheduled completion date, to prevent impact to fleet readiness. However, late 
completion of availabilities is not uncommon, and as a result Naval Sea Systems 
Command (NAVSEA) Deputy Commander for Undersea Warfare (SEA 07) requested a 
study to identify factors that can contribute to availability lateness. This thesis reports on 
interviews of subject-matter experts concerning factors that may influence lateness and 
reports the results of an analysis of availabilities’ historical data across all four naval 
shipyards to include the following naval vessel hulls: CVN 68, SSN 68, SSBN/SSGN 
726, SSN 21, SSN 774, and LHD 1 class ships. 
B. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
The four public naval shipyards: Puget Sound Naval Shipyard and Intermediate 
Maintenance Facility (PSNSY), Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard and Intermediate 
Maintenance Facility (PHNSY), Norfolk Naval Shipyard (NNSY), and Portsmouth Naval 
Shipyard (PNSY), are continually challenged to complete submarine availabilities on 
schedule (“Potential Thesis Topic,” NAVSEA 07, 2011). Figure 1 is a graphical 
representation of historical on-time availabilities from FY’05-FY’11. The historical 
results over the past six years show only 10%–45% of the all availabilities conducted 




until most recently in FY’11, when the Naval shipyards experienced the lowest on-time 
completion percentage of 10%, with three of the four shipyards unable to attain any on-
time completions.  
 
Figure 1.   Historical On Time Percentages (From NAVSEA 04X 2011) 
A naval vessel’s late delivery date back to operational status decreases the fleet 
commanders’ operational readiness due to the reduced number of operational days 
available for vessels held beyond the original agreed upon completion date. 
C. SUBJECT-MATTER EXPERT INTERVIEWS 
To identify possible causes of schedule overruns, several subject-matter experts 
with years of shipyard experience were consulted to identify factors they believed should 
influence availability lateness. Items 1–4, below, summarize the discussions. The views 
expressed are simply opinions from experienced and knowledgeable personnel in the 
field, and the intention of this thesis to further investigate the influence of these factors by 




1. Inadequate Personnel Resources Result in Schedule Overruns 
Multiple availabilities are simultaneously conducted in a shipyard and as a result, 
one availability can draw resources or personnel from other availabilities. This may 
happen to expedite the completion of one availability for whatever operational reason at 
the expense of other availabilities underway at the same time. Personnel resources can be 
drawn not only from other projects going on at the same shipyard, but also from projects 
underway at other Naval shipyards. Thus, one hypothesis is that late availabilities are the 
result of there not being enough experienced workers to complete the work associated 
with the maintenance project in a timely fashion.  
2. New Work Prevents Proper Planning 
Unexpected new work added to the initial work plan is underestimated, resulting 
in schedule overruns. Planning for an availability commences nearly two years prior to 
the start of the project and outlines the expected work to be done and the duration of this 
work is estimated. However, problems inevitably arise during the execution phase of the 
project and it is impossible to identify the number or scope of unexpected new work 
items and their impact on the initially planned schedule of work. 
3. Quantity of Overtime Work is Indicative of Late Availabilities 
Adherence to the day-to-day schedule of an availability prevents work delays; if 
work is delayed, then it must be completed in the latter months of the project. As a 
project runs behind schedule because of daily schedule slippages, the amount of overtime 
work may increase to accelerate work completion in an effort to meet schedule 
requirements. However, budget caps on overtime work may prevent work from being 
completed on time, resulting in late availabilities.  
4. Work Stoppages Impact Adherence to the Planned Schedule 
Work stoppages for those jobs located on or near the critical path of the project 
have a larger impact on schedule overruns. A critical path is defined as the longest path 
of consecutive activities in a project that determines the project’s duration. When work is 
stopped, the actual durations of jobs exceed their planned durations, resulting in follow-
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on work to commence at a later date. More than one instance of a critical path work 
stoppage can result in the initially planned availability end date not being met. 
D.  RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The primary research questions addressed: 
1. Can a statistical analysis of the planned versus actual quantity of work 
performed provide information on availability lateness? 
2. Are there one or more public shipyards that are statistically different than the 
rest in terms of availability planning and execution performance? 
3. Does the quantity and/or length of work stoppages affect the execution phase 
of an availability? 
4. Can an analysis of historical work stoppage data identify possible predictors 
for schedule lateness? 
• Does the quantity of work stoppages affect the availability’s lateness? 
• Is there a common, outlying type of work stoppage present in delayed 
availabilities? 
• Is schedule lateness associated with the timing of work stoppages over the 
life of the availability (i.e., early in the availability versus later in the 
availability)? 
E. BENEFIT OF STUDY 
This study presents results of analyzes of CNO availabilities historical data to 
identify trends, similarities, and differences between on time and late availabilities with 
respect to cost performance, availability length, seasonal impacts, and resource 
commitment in terms of manpower, work stoppages, and other factors. This study can 
assist the Naval Shipyard leadership in focusing on contributing factors for schedule 
lateness and ultimately help develop an indicator to assess an in-progress availabilities’ 
degree of lateness. Although there are numerous factors and variables that can lead to a 
schedule delay, this thesis is meant to be a foundation from which further research can be 
conducted to improve the planning and execution process of depot-level availabilities. 
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F. SCOPE OF THE THESIS 
This thesis presents results of analyzes of CNO availabilities’ historical data 
across all four public naval shipyards to include the following naval vessels hulls: CVN 
68, SSN 688, SSBN/SSGN 726, SSN 21, SSN 774, and LHD 1 class ships. The chapters 
to follow will contain analyses pertaining to: 
• Performance comparison of the four shipyards 
• Lateness comparison of submarine and carrier availabilities 
• Cost performances of late and timely availabilities 
• Impact of availability length on lateness 
• Impact of the number of simultaneous availabilities in the shipyard on 
lateness 
• Trends of availability lateness over time 
• Seasonal impacts on availability lateness 
• Impacts of carrier availabilities on simultaneous submarine availabilities 
• The differences in manpower resources used per month for late and timely 
availabilities. 
Historical work stoppage data are also analyzed. The work stoppage analysis 
focuses on the dynamic relationship between the scheduled availability duration and the 
number of work stoppages. In order to understand this relationship, the work stoppage 
data are organized by the reasons for delay and descriptive statistics are calculated and 
interpreted. The work stoppage data is also summarized by the number of delays 
occurring per unit time during an availability. This unit of measurement results in a 
clearer picture on the schedule/work stoppage interaction, but also allows for the early 
identification of an availability schedule overrun. The ultimate goal of the work stoppage 
research is to present work stoppage data in a new perspective to assist and better inform 
SEA 07 and the naval shipyards’ decision makers on the impact of work stoppages. 
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II. CNO AVAILABILITY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter defines a CNO availability and provides notional background 
information on the availability planning process to include definitions specific to the 
Naval maintenance community. 
B. CNO AVAILABILITIY DEFINED 
An availability is defined as the time during which a U.S. Naval warship is made 
available to a maintenance activity for the accomplishment of maintenance and 
alterations. During an availability, the ship is rendered incapable of fully performing its 
assigned missions and tasks due to the nature of the repair work. The four naval shipyards 
analyzed in this study are considered the Naval Supervisory Authority (NSA), who is in 
charge of coordinating all the maintenance functions on hull, mechanical, electrical, and 
combat equipment and systems that are beyond the organizational capability or capacity 
of a ship (OPNAV N431 2010).  
1. Navy Maintenance Program 
The ships of the United States Navy are built with the latest technologies in the 
fields of structures, hydrodynamics, electrical, mechanical, and combat systems with the 
common goal of protecting the freedoms and executing the policies of the United States. 
As the responsibility to the United States Government and the people of the United 
States, and as described in the Maintenance Policy for United States Navy Ships, 
OPNAVINST 4700.7L, the Navy must achieve the desired operational availability levels 
at the lowest possible total ownership cost. The Navy’s program for maintaining the 
readiness of its ships is separated into two distinct, yet closely related components, ship 
maintenance and ship modernization. The ship maintenance program is established to 
maintain the operational readiness of the ship and its currently installed systems; whereas 
the ship modernization program is established to increase ship capability and/or improve 
the reliability and maintainability of the existing systems.  
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Navy maintenance is classified into three capability levels, with each level 
increasing in capability required to perform the intended maintenance. The lowest 
maintenance level, organizational-level maintenance, consists of all maintenance actions 
within the capability of the ship’s crew, known as ship’s force. Typical organizational-
level maintenance includes preventative maintenance (cleaning, lubricating, and 
operability testing) and corrective maintenance (component replacement and 
troubleshooting). This level of maintenance is promulgated by the ship specific 
maintenance plan. The second level, intermediate-level maintenance, is defined as the 
maintenance that requires skills and facilities normally beyond those of the organizational 
level but does not require depot-level skills. Intermediate-level maintenance is performed 
by fleet maintenance activities (i.e., shore-based maintenance commands, naval 
shipyards, and regional maintenance centers) and is promulgated by the fleet commander 
or authorized representative. Maintenance actions scheduled and accomplished at the 
intermediate-level is considered a non-CNO availability due to the nature of the repair 
work and ship’s assigned tasking. Intermediate-level maintenance consists of but is not 
limited to all organizational-level maintenance, installation of alterations (modifications), 
provision of services (i.e., power, gas, and specific tools), and technical assistance to 
ship’s force in diagnosing and repair. 
The highest maintenance level, depot-level maintenance, consists of maintenance 
that requires facilities and capabilities beyond the intermediate level and is performed by 
the public or private shipyards. Depot-level maintenance is promulgated by the CNO, and 
scheduled according to the ship-class specific maintenance plan (i.e., CVN 68 class). 
Depot-level maintenance periods are classified as a CNO availability, which consists of 
but is not limited to organizational- and intermediate-level maintenance, repair and 
modernization of the propulsion, electric, and auxiliary plants, and structural repairs 




2. CNO Availability Stakeholders 
A CNO availability relies not only on one command, but rather multiple 
commands and supporting activities to ensure the successful planning and execution of 
the maintenance period. The following list lists the key stakeholders and an overview of 
their responsibilities: 
• CNO Staff – Maintain, review, and approve maintenance program master 
plan for all class ships. 
• Fleet and Type Commanders – Maintain the depot maintenance intervals 
and cycles for ships under their command, and plan for and monitor 
availability executions to achieve a balance of cost and schedule. 
• NAVSEA – As the lead technical authority, establish performance 
standards for the accomplishment of all maintenance and modernizations, 
and to ensure the Executing Activities perform the repairs and 
modernization within the scope of the work authorized. 
• NSA – Coordinate and integrate all maintenance actions accomplished by 
all Executing Activities during a CNO availability and is responsible for 
the on-time completion of all work. 
• Lead Maintenance Activity (LMA) – Responsible for all work being 
accomplished, possesses the authority to organize, structure, and 
coordinate all execution matters. 
• Executing Activities – Specific commands and private companies 
contracted to perform certain maintenance actions during the availability. 
• Ship’s Force – Maintain open communication and provide support, when 
needed, to NSA and the Executing Activities. 
C. CNO AVAILABILITY PLANNING PROCESS 
The planning phase for a CNO availability starts as far out as two years prior to 
the availability start date, with the initial issue of the Availability Work Package (AWP). 
The AWP consists of maintenance actions, known interchangeably as work items or jobs, 
and ship alterations identified by ship’s force, NAVSEA, and other supporting 
engineering commands, known as codes. The initial AWP identifies the known work and 
class alterations that must be completed during the availability. Additional work items are 




planning phase. The discovery periods are conducted by ship’s force with oversight and 
assists from the fleet support activities that specialize in pre-availability testing and ship 
deficiency identification.  
Job summaries (JSs) are created for all work items in the AWP and are the 
fundamental planning elements that allow an availability’s project schedule to be 
determined. A JS identifies the instructions relevant to the job; breaks down the required 
work necessary for job completion; and allows for the planning of resources and control 
of work during the execution phase. JSs are created by the engineering and planning 
codes and are then issued to the availability’s management team for review. The review 
accounts for accuracies in skill designations, and sufficiency in durations and 
management ability. The JS review is an iterative process and continues until all required 
work and resources are approved and are written into Technical Work Documents 
(TWDs). Upon start of the availability and the execution phase, TWDs are issued to the 
Executing Activities, providing specific instructions on the work needing completion 
(“Baseline Project Management Plan,” NAVSEA 07, 2009). 
D. AVAILABILITY TYPES AND MAINTENANCE PHILOSOPHIES 
The following section contains a list describing the different types of availabilities 
that are performed at the four naval shipyards as defined by Representative Intervals, 
Duration, and Repair Mandays for Depot Level Maintenance Availabilities of U.S. Navy 
Ships, OPNAVNOTE 4700. 
1. Progressive Maintenance (PROG) 
A maintenance philosophy designed to support ships with reduced manning, 
limited organizational level maintenance, and operational tempos that limit availability 
periods. It is also designed to sustain a high level of readiness and increase the ship’s 





2. Engineered Operating Cycle (EOC) 
A maintenance philosophy to keep ships in an acceptable material condition while 
sustaining or increasing the operational availability of the ship; it is earmarked by a 
structured engineered approach for ship maintenance while minimizing time spent in 
depot-level availabilities. 
3. Selected Restricted Availability (SRA) 
A short intensive industrial period assigned to ships in PROG or EOC 
maintenance programs for the accomplishment of maintenance and selected 
modernization,  where ships assigned to PROG are maintained through SRAs in lieu of 
overhauls. 
4. Engineered Refueling Overhaul (ERO) 
A major availability comprised of maintenance and modernization work items; 
normally exceeding six months in duration. 
5. Inactivation Availability (IA) 
“An availability assigned to prepare a ship for inactivation or disposal.” 
6. Docking Selected Restricted Availability (DSRA) 
“An SRA expanded to include maintenance and modernization that require dry-
docking.” 
7. Phased Maintenance (PM) and Phased Maintenance Availability  
  (PMA) 
A maintenance philosophy that uses depot level maintenance through a series of 
short, frequent labor-intensive PMA in lieu of regular overhauls. The goals of PM are to 
maximize ship availability, improve operational readiness, and upgrade material 
condition. 
8. Docking Phased Maintenance Availability (DPMA) 
A PMA in which the AWP requires dry-docking. 
9. Depot Modernization Period (DMP) 
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An availability scheduled primarily for the installation of major alterations. 
10. Extended Docking Selected Restricted Availability (EDSRA) 
An extended DSRA allowing for a larger AWP. 
11. Interim Dry-Docking (IDD) 
“A hull specific availability used to extend the operating cycle prior to the next 
major maintenance availability.” 
12. Major Maintenance Period (MMP) 
“An on-site non-CNO availability for SSGNs for the accomplishment of 
maintenance and modernization.” 
13. Continuous Maintenance (CM) 
“Scheduled depot level maintenance conducted outside of CNO availabilities.” 
14. Incremental Maintenance Plan (IMP) 
“A maintenance philosophy which ensures aircraft carriers are kept in an 
acceptable material condition through a series of incremental depot maintenance actions. 
Aircraft carriers assigned to IMPs are maintained through PIAs and DPIAs, defined next, 
in lieu of overhauls.” 
15. Planned Incremental Availabilities (PIA) 
Maintenance and modernization work items are accomplished in this labor-
intensive availability of less than six months in duration for aircraft carriers in an IMP.  
16. Docking Planned Incremental Availabilities (DPIA) 
In this labor-intensive availability of less than one year in duration for aircraft 
carriers in an IMP, maintenance and modernization are accomplished in dry-dock. 
E. SUMMARY 
This chapter gave information pertaining to shipyard availabilities and provided 
information concerning of the differences in the types of availabilities conducted at the 
four shipyards. 
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III. TOP-LEVEL SHIPYARD PERFORMANCE DATA ANALYSIS  
A. INTRODUCTION 
The top-level shipyard performance data are obtained from the Assistant Deputy 
Commander Industrial Operations (SEA 04X). SEA 04X is a supporting department 
under the Deputy Commander for Logistics, Maintenance and Industrial Operations 
(SEA 04). SEA 04X is the reporting command for all four public shipyards in regard to 
business and technical matters and is responsible for providing methodological oversight 
and for maintaining standardized practices and engineering methods across the public 
shipyards (NAVSEA 04Z 2011). In addition, SEA 04X collects and analyzes shipyard 
data and metrics in order to provide accurate performance measurements. These 
performance measurements allow SEA 04 to formulate and implement performance 
improvement techniques. 
The data are in the form of an Excel spreadsheet. The data consists of several 
different performance metrics for availabilities that occurred in the four Navy-owned 
shipyards dating as far back as 2001. Data are available for a total of 108 historical 
availabilities, 23 of which were conducted at Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard, 34 conducted 
in Norfolk Naval Shipyard, 21 in Portsmouth Naval Shipyard, and 30 in Puget Sound 
Naval Shipyard. The data also include 18 availabilities that are still underway at the time 
of this analysis, with three in Norfolk, four in Pearl Harbor, five in Portsmouth, and six in 
Puget Sound. Data for completed availabilities and data for on-going availabilities were 
initially separated so that a study could be made for completed availabilities. In the 
remainder of this chapter only data from completed availabilities are considered. 
B. DATA SET DESCRIPTION 
The data set displays the project name, along with hull type, hull number, and 
shipyard in which the availability took place. For each project there are data for budgeted 
and actual quantity of work performed (BQWP and AQWP respectively); cost 
performance (CP = BQWP/AQWP); quantity of overtime work in man-days; the 
percentage the overtime work is of all actual work performed (OT and %OT); and the 
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number of days the complete project is late (negative days are associated with projects 
finishing early). The budgeted quantity of work performed describes, in man-days, the 
earned value of work completed whereas the actual quantity of work performed describes 
the charged value of work performed in completing the availability (“Baseline Project 
Management Plan,” NAVSEA 07, 2009). Figure 2 displays an example of one of the data 
sets: the USS JEFFERSON CITY, a Depot Modernization Project occurring in Puget 
Sound Naval Shipyard during the period 2003 to 2004. 
 
Project ID Type Hull Avail Type SY BQWP AQWP
S59 SSN 759 DMP PSNSY 190,604 239,824
On Time?
1=Yes; 0=No
2/15/03 8/1/04 0.79 46,912 19.60% 3/15/04 0 139 FY'04





Figure 2.   Sample SEA 04X Historical Availability Data  
As can be seen, the project identification number is given (S59) as well as the 
project title, hull type (SSN), hull number (759), availability type (DMP), and the 
associated shipyard where the availability took place is also given (PSNSY). Days late 
can be either a positive or negative number, with a positive number meaning the project 
went beyond the planned end date and a negative number meaning the project was 
complete a certain number of days prior to the planned end. 
C. COMPARING THE SHIPYARDS 
The number of days late for completed availabilities in each shipyard is first 
investigated. Tables 1 through 4 display the number of availabilities completed on-time 
or late between 1 and 30 days, 31 to 60 days, 61 to 90 days, and availabilities late by 91 
days or more. Figures 3 through 6 display the summaries graphically. The histogram data 






15 of 34 = 
44.10%
5 of 34 = 
14.70%
9 of 34 = 
26.50%
2 of 34 = 
5.90%
3 of 34 = 
8.80%
Ahead of schedule
Finish btw 1-30 days late
Finish btw 31-60 days late
Finish btw 61-90 days late
Finish more than 90 days late
 
Table 1.   Availability Completions For Norfolk Naval Shipyard 
 







4 of 23 = 
17.40%
7 of 23 = 
30.40%
3 of 23 = 
13.00%
4 of 23 = 
17.40%
5 of 23 = 
21.70%
Finish btw 1-30 days late
Finish btw 31-60 days late
Finish btw 61-90 days late
Finish more than 90 days late
Ahead of schedule
 
Table 2.   Availability Completions For Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard 
 
Figure 4.   Number of Completed Availabilities at Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard 
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% Frequency
3 of 21 = 
14.30%
6 of 21 = 
28.60%
3 of 21 = 
14.30%
3 of 21 = 
14.30%
6 of 21 = 
28.60%
Finish btw 31-60 days late
Finish btw 61-90 days late
Finish more than 90 days late
Ahead of schedule
Finish btw 1-30 days late
 
Table 3.   Availability Completions For Portsmouth Naval Shipyard 
 






15 of 30 = 
50.00%
8 of 30 = 
26.70%
2 of 30 = 
6.70%
1 of 30 = 
3.30%
4 of 30 = 
13.30%
Finish btw 61-90 days late
Finish more than 90 days late
Ahead of schedule
Finish btw 1-30 days late
Finish btw 31-60 days late
 
Table 4.   Availability Completions For Puget Sound Naval Shipyard 
 
Figure 6.   Number of Completed Availabilities at Puget Sound Naval Shipyard 
It is apparent that a majority of availabilities at three of the four shipyards end 
after the planned completion date. Only Puget Sound Naval Shipyard has 50 percent of 
availabilities completed on-time or ahead of schedule. Table 5 displays the actual 











Norfolk 55.90% 34 8.50%
Pearl Harbor 82.60% 23 7.90%
Portsmouth 85.70% 21 7.60%
Puget Sound 50.00% 20 11.20%  
Table 5.   Percentage of Completed Availabilities Ended Late from 2001 to 2011 
The percentages in Table 5 are associated with the corresponding number of 
availabilities shown. Since the percentages are based on a small number of data (only 20 
through 34), the standard error of the percentage of availabilities late is shown to provide 
an estimate of the possible range of percentages. For example, one could estimate that the 
true mean percentage of availabilities that are late at Norfolk Naval Shipyard as between 
47.4% and 64.4% (55.9% ± 8.5).  
Table 6 (respectively, Table 7) displays the percentage of completed availabilities 
that are late for both submarines and carriers. The results suggest that carrier availabilities 










Norfolk 62.50% 13 13.40%
Pearl Harbor 82.60% 23 7.90%
Portsmouth 85.00% 20 8.00%
Puget Sound 62.50% 16 12.10%  














Norfolk 36.40% 11 14.50%
Pearl Harbor N/A 0 N/A
Portsmouth N/A 0 N/A
Puget Sound 30.80% 13 12.80%  
Table 7.   Percentage of Carrier Availabilities Ended Late per Shipyard 
These tables raise several questions: “Why are carrier availabilities outperforming 
submarine availabilities?” and “Could there be a statistically significant difference 
between the performance of Norfolk and Puget Sound and the performance of 
Portsmouth and Pearl Harbor in completing submarine availabilities in a timely fashion?” 
The percentages and associated standard errors so far do not indicate a statistically 
significant difference between the results at the different shipyards. However, there is a 
statistically significant difference between the mean late percentages of carrier 
availabilities and submarine availabilities. In this context, claiming that the means of two 
sets of data are statistically significantly different implies that the two means cannot be 
accepted as equal or similar, based on the differences of the means as well as the spread 
of the plausible mean values for each data set as illustrated by the standard error. Two 
sample t-tests, with the assumption that the means of the two sets of data have unequal 
variances, are conducted via computer software such as Microsoft Excel to determine if 
the means of two sets of data are statistically significantly different. Additional 
information on this approach appears in Section D. 
D. COMPARING THE COST PERFORMANCE MEANS 
In this section, associations between cost performance, overtime percentage, and 
the lateness of the availability are studied. In particular, the possible association between 
cost performance (CP = BQWP/AQWP) and overtime percentage (OT%) between 
projects ending late and projects ending on-time or ahead of schedule is investigated. 
Table 8 displays the descriptive statistics for the four shipyards: 
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Late Not Late Late Not Late
Mean: 0.87 0.93 Mean: 20.5 20.2
StDev: 0.09 0.07 StDev: 6.8 4.8
StError: 0.02 0.02 StError: 0.02 0.01
Sample Size: 19 15 Sample Size: 19 15
Mean: 0.83 0.92 Mean: 20 17.7
StDev: 0.08 0.08 StDev: 4.1 4.22
StError: 0.02 0.04 StError: 0.01 0.02
Sample Size: 19 4 Sample Size: 19 4
Mean: 0.9 1.03 Mean: 20.6 20.3
StDev: 0.08 0.14 StDev: 7.4 8.05
StError: 0.02 0.08 StError: 0.02 0.05
Sample Size: 18 3 Sample Size: 18 3
Mean: 0.87 0.97 Mean: 19.1 16.1
StDev: 0.1 0.06 StDev: 5.4 3.05
StError: 0.03 0.02 StError: 0.01 0.01













Table 8.   Mean Cost Performances and Overtime Percentages for the Four Shipyards 
With this information, a comparison is made between the population means of CP 
and OT% for late and timely availabilities across all shipyards with the assumption that 
the samples are independent and have unequal variances. The null hypothesis in this 
analysis is that the mean CP for late projects equals the mean CP of on-time projects. If 
the null hypothesis is rejected, then the alternative hypothesis that there is a statistically 
significant difference between the two means is accepted. The t-statistic for the null 
hypothesis is computed using equation 1: 







Equation 1. T-statistic to Test Significant Differences between CP Population Means 
 
The t-statistic for the null hypothesis may either fall in the acceptance or rejection 
region as determined by the critical t-value tα/2,n-1, where n stands for smaller sample size 
of the two populations being compared. The null hypothesis is rejected if |t| > tα/2,n-1 
(Hayter 2007). Results are displayed in Table 9 comparing CP and overtime percentages 




Mean Late 0.87 0.2
Variance Late 0.008 0.004
Mean On-Time 0.95 0.18
Variance On-Time 0.006 0.002
Confidence Level 95% 95%
t-statistic 5.28 1.76
critical t-value 1.99 1.99
P-value 9.70E-07 0.081
Reject null? Yes No  
Table 9.   Results in Testing for Significant Difference of the Means for Cost 
Performance and Overtime Percentage 
Table 9 displays the mean CP and overtime percentage for late and timely 
availabilities across the four shipyards. The variance for each value gives an indication of 
the spread of the values for each data set. The results suggest that there is a significant 
difference between the CP for projects that finish on-time and those that end late. The 
results for OT% do not necessarily show conclusive evidence that the means are 
significantly different. From this, it is concluded that the overtime percentages for late 
and timely availabilities are statistically similar. 
E. COST PERFORMANCE GOAL 
Availabilities that finish late tend to possess a CP which is less than the CP of on-
schedule availabilities that finish early or on time. The possibility of specifying a CP to 
strive for in order to ensure a timely availability is investigated. One-sided t-confidence 
intervals are constructed based on the given data sets to determine a lower 99% 
confidence bound for the average CP for those availabilities that finished on time or 
ahead of schedule and an upper 99% confidence bound for those availabilities that 
finished late. The one-sided confidence interval formula appear in equations 2 and 3; µ is 
the sample mean and s is the sample standard deviation:  




αμ −= −∞ +
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Equation 2. Upper Confidence Bound for CP of Late Availabilities 
 




αμ −= − ∞
 
Equation 3. Lower Confidence Bound for CP of Timely Availabilities 
 
The sample means, standard deviations, and sample sizes are computed from the 
data sets reflecting all the completed availabilities across the four shipyards and all hull 
types. Table 10 displays the descriptive statistics of the data as well as the upper-bound of 
the confidence interval for the late availabilities and the lower-bound of the confidence 
interval for the on-time availabilities. A confidence level of 99%was used for the 
confidence intervals. In addition, the quantiles of the data are displayed to illustrate the 
percentage of availabilities with certain CPs. 
 
Mean 0.87 100.00% maximum 1.06
Std Dev 0.09 90.00% 1
Std Err Mean 0.01 75.00% quartile 0.93
Upper 99% Confidence Bound 0.89 50.00% median 0.87
Num Avails 71 25.00% quartile 0.81
10.00% 0.75
0.00% minimum 0.62
Mean 0.95 100.00% maximum 1.19
Std Dev 0.08 90.00% 1.04
Std Err Mean 0.01 75.00% quartile 1.01
Lower 99% Confidence Bound 0.92 50.00% median 0.95
Num Avails 37 25.00% quartile 0.89
10.00% 0.86
0.00% minimum 0.83
Cost Performance for Late Availabilities
Descriptive Statistics Quantiles
Cost Performance for On-Time Availabilities
Descriptive Statistics Quantiles
 
Table 10.   Cost Performance Data Comparison for Late and Timely Availabilities 
Figure 7 displays a histogram of the CP ratio for availabilities that finish late and 
availabilities that finish early or on time. The results of Table 10 suggest that one could 
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say with 99% confidence that late availabilities will have a mean CP ratio of 0.89 or less 
and that on-time availabilities will have a mean CP of 0.92 or higher. However, it appears 
that there is a large overlap of CP values among late availabilities and on-time/early 
availabilities. Twenty-five percent of late availabilities have a CP ratio of 0.93 or higher, 
whereas twenty-five percent of on-time availabilities have a CP ratio of 0.89 or lower. 
Although management can strive to ensure a CP ratio of 0.92 or higher, it does not 
necessarily guarantee a timely availability. 
 
 
Figure 7.   Frequency of Cost Performance Ratios for Late and Timely Availabilities 
E. DAYS LATE VERSUS AVAILABILITY LENGTH 
In this section, associations between availability length and the lateness of the 
availability are studied. In this case, longer availabilities are availabilities with longer 
planned lengths due to the quantity of jobs in the work package and their associated 
expected times to completion. The availabilities are arbitrarily partitioned into 3 
categories: short with scheduled length less than or equal to 200 days; medium with a 
scheduled length between 200 and 400 days; and long with a scheduled length of 400 
days or greater. Of the 108 completed availabilities considered, 52 had lengths of 200 
days or fewer, 27 had lengths between 200 and 400 days, and 29 had lengths of 400 days 
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or greater. The availabilities consist of various hulls, including carriers, submarines 
(SSN, SSBN, and SSGN), as well as Landing Helicopter Dock (LHD) amphibious assault 
ships across all four the shipyards. Roughly 70% of the data are from submarine 
availabilities and 22% are from carrier availabilities. Table 11 displays the percentage of 
availabilities ending on time for each of the three availability length ranges. 
 
0-200 Days 200-400 Days 400+ Days
# Availabilities 52 27 29
% Late 59.60% 66.70% 75.90%
% Late Std Error 6.80% 9.10% 7.90%
Mean Length 131 332 694
Mean Days Late 44.5 50.2 106
Mean Days Late % 42.40% 14.30% 16.70%





Table 11.   Lateness Statistics of Availabilities of Various Lengths 
Table 11 suggests that the longer availabilities are late a greater percentage of the 
time than the shorter availabilities, perhaps indicating that larger availabilities have a 
greater probability of ending late than shorter ones. However, the standard errors are 
large enough to indicate that there is no statistically significant difference between the 
percentage of availabilities that are late for each category of availabilities. The row 
labeled “mean late %” represents the number of days late as a percentage of the initial 
planned length of the availability (for the late availabilities), and it is seen from the table 
that, on a percentage basis, shorter availabilities that are late typically have a percentage 
of late days far greater than the longer availabilities that are late (42% versus 14% to 
16%). A two sample t-test has shown that there is a statistically significant difference in 
the ‘mean late %’ for the short availabilities (0–200 days length) and the longer 
availabilities. This can be an indication of inaccurate planning for the shorter 
availabilities or an inadequate amount of buffer space allowed in the schedule for 
unexpected issues, work stoppages, or new work. There is no statistically significant 
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difference in the ‘mean late days %’ for the medium (200–400 day length) and long (400 
days or more) availabilities. Table 12 displays summary statistics to consider submarine 
availabilities and carrier availabilities separately and the various results based on 
availability length. 
 
0-200 Days 200-400 Days 400+ Days
# Availabilities 31 15 29
% Late 71.00% 80.00% 75.90%
% Late Std Error 8.2 10.3 7.9
Mean Length 113 356 694
StDev Length 33 40 193
Mean Days Late 48 62 106
Mean DaysLate % 50.70% 17.00% 16.70%
Mean Days Late % 
Std Error
9 9.7 6.9
0-200 Days 200-400 Days 400+ Days
# Availabilities 16 8 0
% Late 31.25% 37.50% N/A
% Late Std Error 11.6 17.1 N/A
Mean Length 160 295 N/A
StDev Length 38 54 N/A
Mean Days Late 17 49 N/A
Mean Days Late % 11.07% 22.80% N/A






Table 12.   Lateness Statistics of Submarine and Carrier Availabilities of Various 
Lengths 
When the data are summarized by the number of days late as a percentage of 
availability planned length, submarine projects between 0 and 200 days have a mean 
percentage that is substantially higher than the mean percentage of days late for longer 
submarine projects. The following plot may offer a better illustration of availability 




Figure 8.   Days Late Percentage as a Function of Planned Availability Length 
In Figure 8, the variability of the percentages of availability lateness is roughly 
the same for availabilities between 200 days to 800 days. Of the 31 availabilities with 
scheduled length less than or equal to 200 days, 9 are late by more than 50% of their 
scheduled availability length. Of these 9 availabilities, 7 of them completed in 2006 or 
earlier, two completed in 2008, and 0 had a days late percentage of 50% or higher after 
2008. This possibly indicates an improvement in submarine availability days late 
percentages over time. 
Figure 9 displays the number of days late versus availability length; the plot 
includes all availability types and all hulls. It can be seen that many short availabilities 
are late by as many days as availabilities 400, 600, or 1000 days in length. Table 13 
displays the percentage of short, medium, and long availabilities that are either on time, 
late up to 30 days, late between 31 and 60 days, or late more than 60 days. A t-test 
comparing the mean days late for short and medium availabilities reveals no statistically 
significant difference, despite the 200 day difference in average availability length. 
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<= 0 21 40.40% 6.80%
1 to 30 15 28.80% 6.30%
31 to 60 9 17.30% 5.20%
60+ 7 13.50% 4.70%
<= 0 9 33.30% 9.10%
1 to 30 8 29.60% 8.80%
31 to 60 5 18.50% 7.50%
60+ 5 18.50% 7.50%
<= 0 7 24.10% 7.90%
1 to 30 3 10.30% 5.70%
31 to 60 3 10.30% 5.70%






Standard Error of 
Percentage






Standard Error of 
Percentage






Standard Error of 
Percentage
Long Availabilities (400+ days in length)
 
Table 13.   Lateness Frequencies of Availabilities of Various Lengths 
 
Figure 9.   Number of Days Late as a Function of Planned Availability Length 
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F. NUMBER OF AVAILABILITIES IN THE SHIPYARD VERSUS THE 
NUMBER OF DAYS LATE AS A PERCENTAGE OF PLANNED 
AVAILABILITY LENGTH 
In this subsection, associations between number of availabilities being conducted 
in a yard and availability lateness is studied. For instance, availabilities may be more 
likely to be late and have a greater number of days late as a percentage of planned length 
if there are a total of 8 availabilities going on at the shipyard, causing the shipyard to use 
more of its resources and to operate at close to maximum capacity as opposed to 
operating at 50% capacity with only 4 availabilities underway. Gantt charts are 
constructed for each of the four shipyards illustrating the historical schedule of all the 
availabilities that took place in each shipyard dating as far back as 2001 and extending all 
the way to as recent as 2011. The Gantt charts are effective in showing the number of 
total availabilities as well as the different kinds of vessels being worked on across certain 
time periods. Figure 10 displays the Gantt chart for data from Norfolk Naval Shipyard 




Figure 10.   Availabilities in Norfolk Naval Shipyard between 2005 and 2009 
In Figure 10, the blue bars represent submarine availabilities, the red represent 
carrier availabilities, the green represent LHD availabilities, the purple represent MTS 
availabilities, and the yellow represents an AS availability. The start and finish dates of 
the corresponding availabilities are given in the columns labeled ‘Start’ and ‘Finish.’ 
Even though data for availabilities starting as early as 2003 and ending as late as 2011 are 
available, the time range of 2005 to 2009 is studied to ensure all the availabilities that 
occurred during those years are included.  
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There are certain time periods where more projects are underway than in others. 
Using the Gantt chart of Norfolk in Figure 10, one can see that there were only three 
projects underway in Quarters 2 and 3 of 2006 whereas in Quarters 2 and 3 of 2007 there 
are six and in Quarters 1 and 2 of 2008 there were as many as eight projects underway. 
To study possible associations between availability lateness and the number of ongoing 
projects, the number of availabilities that were underway is counted in the shipyard each 
year from 2005 to 2009. It is assumed that an availability that is underway for a minimum 
of 3 months during a year may have an impact on other availabilities being conducted 
during that year. Thus, if an availability ended in February of 2005 as in the case of the 
depot modernization period for the USS Boise (BBE), it was not counted towards the 
total number of availabilities underway in 2005. The next step averages the days late as a 
percentage of the planned length of the availability of the availabilities that were 
underway for at least 3 months for each year. The percentage figures next to each color 
coded bar in the Gantt chart above represent the days late as a percentage of the planned 
length of the availability. As an example using the Norfolk Gantt chart displayed in 
Figure 10, seven total availabilities were counted for 2005: FLA, PRT, HPN, GRG, 
NEW, ENW, and CHR. Their corresponding days late percentages are then averaged, as 
displayed in Equation 4. 
0% 16.44% 11.08% 8.77% 41.47% 0% 39.65% 16.8%
7Availabilities
+ + + + + + =
 
Equation 4. Sample Calculation of Mean Days Late Percentage for Availabilities 
Underway Simultaneously in a Shipyard 
 
Table 14 displays the percentage of availabilities that are late as well as the average 
number of days late as a percentage of scheduled availability length (Mean Days Late %) 
for the years 2005 to 2009 for each of the four shipyards. 
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2005 7 486.1 85.70% 16.80% 14.10%
2006 6 581 66.70% 11.30% 12.90%
2007 8 467.3 62.50% 13.00% 11.90%
2008 9 315.1 66.70% 8.40% 9.20%
2009 7 301.2 50.00% 4.00% 7.40%
2005 5 291 100.00% 60.70% 21.80%
2006 6 387.5 83.30% 27.60% 18.20%
2007 3 451.7 66.70% 6.20% 13.90%
2008 6 429.7 66.70% 8.70% 11.50%
2009 5 499 80.00% 13.10% 15.10%
2005 4 516 100.00% 19.40% 19.80%
2006 5 474.2 100.00% 19.10% 17.60%
2007 6 341.8 100.00% 28.10% 18.30%
2008 7 399.7 100.00% 18.50% 14.70%
2009 6 433.5 83.30% 9.50% 12.00%
2005 4 797.3 25.00% 0.80% 4.60%
2006 7 445.6 57.10% 19.50% 15.00%
2007 7 422.1 57.10% 12.70% 12.60%
2008 7 505.9 28.60% 3.10% 6.60%

































Table 14.   Days Late Percentage Statistics with Various Amounts of Availabilities 
Underway in the Shipyard 
The summary statistics in Table 14 suggest no clear association between the 
number of availabilities underway in the yard and the mean days-late percentage. In the 
case of Portsmouth, there are six availabilities underway for a majority of 2007 and 2009, 
but the mean of the days-late percentages are 28.1% and 9.5%, respectively. For 
Portsmouth, there does not seem to be much difference between the days late percentage 
of those availabilities in 2005 when only four are underway and those in 2008 when 
seven are underway. Figure 11 displays data from Table 14. 
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Figure 11.   Days Late Percentage as a Function of the Number of Availabilities 
Underway in the Shipyard 
The data displayed in Figure 11 does not suggest a simple relationship between 
the percentage of days late and the number of availabilities in the yard. The greatest days 
late percentage for Pearl Harbor occurs with five availabilities underway simultaneously 
as compared to four or six. The greatest percentage of days late for Norfolk occurs with 
seven availabilities in the yard as compared to six or nine, and Portsmouth has the 
greatest percentage of days late with six availabilities in yard as compared to four or 
seven. Further investigation of any differences between shipyard managerial practices or 
availability planning methods that may exist with differing numbers of availabilities in 
the shipyard can lead to increased knowledge of the reasons behind availability lateness. 
However, taking the standard errors of mean days late percentages into consideration, one 
can conclude that there is no statistically significant difference between the percentage of 
days late with regard to the number of availabilities in the shipyard. 
Something that stands out from the data summaries displayed in Table 14 is the 
general improvement in the percentage of days late performance across all the four 
shipyards from 2005 to 2009. By simply observing the days-late metric across these 
years, the 
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days late percentage has been decreasing. Figure 12 displays the days-late percentage as a 
function of year. The dotted lines represent one standard error about the mean for Pearl 
Harbor and Puget Sound. 
 
 
Figure 12.   Days Late Percentage Trends from 2005 to 2009 
With the exception of 2005, the performance of each shipyard is similar for the 
years 2006 to 2009. The small number of availabilities considered result in large standard 
errors for the mean days late percentage; there is no statistically significant difference in 
the days late percentage between the shipyards between 2006 and 2009. Also, it appears 
that the mean days late percentage across all shipyards is trending downwards from year 
to year after 2006. Because of this, it is of interest to see how the days late percentage of 
availabilities changes from year to year across all shipyards beyond the 2005 to 2009 
period. Table 15 displays the mean days-late percentage of all the availabilities that were 
underway in three separate periods: 2005 and earlier, 2006–2008, and 2009–2010. 
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2003 to 2005 2006 to 2008 2009 to 2011
# Availabilities 8 14 12
Mean Days Late % 8.10% 9.90% 11.90%
Std Error 5.40% 3.60% 5.70%
2003 to 2005 2006 to 2008 2009 to 2011
# Availabilities 8 9 6
Mean Days Late % 79.20% 16.10% 9.70%
Std Error 24.70% 7.30% 3.90%
2003 to 2005 2006 to 2008 2009 to 2011
# Availabilities 6 10 5
Mean Days Late % 12.20% 28.60% 7.30%
Std Error 7.40% 8.20% 7.20%
2002 to 2005 2006 to 2008 2009 to 2011
# Availabilities 8 12 7
Mean Days Late % 10.10% 14.20% 5.10%






Table 15.   Lateness Statistics over Time 
Table 15 displays the number of availabilities underway in each of the associated 
time periods, along with the mean days late as a percentage of planned length and 
associated standard errors for those availabilities. For an availability to be associated with 
the 2003 to 2005 time period, a majority of the availability had to take place in that time 




was associated with the 2003 to 2005 time period because the availability took place for 
eight months in 2005 and only 3 months in 2006. Figure 13 displays the data in the 
Table 15.  
 
 
Figure 13.   Days Late Percentage Trends from 2003 to 2011 
It can be seen that Pearl Harbor shows a continual improvement in the percentage 
of days late of its availabilities over the three time periods, whereas Norfolk shows a 
nearly consistent percentage of days late. Even if one availability skews the mean 
percentage values, as in the case of Norfolk’s performance in 2009 through 2011 where 
one availability conducted on an MTS with a percentage of days late of 62% skewed the 
average higher, the assumption that all availabilities within a shipyard are interdependent 
means that the averages properly reflect the performance of the shipyards during that 
time period. Since Portsmouth and Puget Sound also show improvement in 2009 through 
2011 over the 2006 through 2008 periods; although with large associated standard errors, 
it is possible that the mean percentage of days late of availabilities in general have been 
decreasing after 2006. 
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G. EFFECTS OF WINTER MONTHS ON AVAILABILITY LATENESS  
In this subsection, associations between the times of year an availability is 
conducted in Puget Sound and Portsmouth and the number of days late is investigated; in 
particular it is of interest to investigate possible associations between average percentage 
of days late and number of months an availability is conducted during the winter months 
for Puget Sound and Portsmouth. For completed availabilities dating back to 2002, the 
amount of time the availability is conducted in the winter months as a percentage of the 
entire length of the availability is calculated and then plotted against the availability’s 
associated days late as a percentage of planned length. The initial hypothesis is that the 
greater the percentage of time conducted during the winter months, the greater the 
number of days late as a percentage of the availability length. The months associated with 
the most extreme weather in Portsmouth are assumed to be December through April 
because this is the time period when the Portsmouth, New Hampshire/Kittery, Maine area 
would typically experience the most snowfall (8–12 inches per month December through 
March) and rainfall (over 9 inches in April, which is 2–3 times more than any other 
month during the year). The months associated with the most extreme weather in Puget 
Sound are assumed to be November through March. The Bremerton, Washington area 
does not typically experience great amounts of snowfall, however it is during these 
months where there is the greatest amounts of rainfall as compared to the rest of the year. 
Figure 14 and 15 display the results obtained for submarine availabilities. 
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Figure 14.   Days Late Percentage as a Function of Percentage of Availability Duration 
in Inclement Weather Months at Puget Sound Naval Shipyard 
 
Figure 15.   Days Late Percentage as a Function of Percentage of Availability Duration 
in Inclement Weather Months at Portsmouth Naval Shipyard  
In the case of Puget Sound, there may be some association between the amount of 
time spent in the winter months and the number of days late as a percentage of 
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availability length. 25% of the availabilities with 30% to 40% of time conducted in the 
winter months had a days late percentage of 20% or more. Over 28% of the availabilities 
(2 of 7) with a 40% to 50% percentage of time conducted in winter had a days late 
percentage of 20% or more. Also, of all the availabilities where less than 30% of time 
was spent during the winter months, none had greater than 20% days late as a percentage 
of planned length. In the case of Portsmouth, there does not seem to be as clear an 
association between the amount of time an availability is conducted in the winter months 
and the days late percentage. Portsmouth has an example of an availability with no time 
spent in the winter months but still having a number of days late that is roughly 65% the 
length of the original planned length. 
H. IMPACT OF CARRIER AVAILABILITIES ON SUBMARINE 
AVAILABILITIES 
It has been speculated among subject-matter experts that carrier availabilities take 
precedence over submarine availabilities when it comes to timely maintenance project 
completion. This is due to a fewer number of carriers and the fact that carrier 
maintenance can impact the operational schedules of entire carrier battle groups. A 
hypothesis is that carrier availabilities may draw on manpower resources available from 
submarine availabilities in order to ensure timely completion. If this is the case, it would 
be interesting to study on a case by case basis the days late percentage of a submarine 
availability as a function of the number of carrier availabilities underway during the 
submarine’s availability schedule. Data from fifteen submarine availabilities at Puget 
Sound are examined to determine the duration that either one or two other carrier 
availabilities were underway as a percentage of the total length of the submarine 
availability. For example, if a submarine availability lasts 200 days, and during 30 days 
of that time period two other carrier availabilities were being conducted and during 100 
days only one other carrier availability was being conducted, then for 15% of the 
availability (30/200) two other carrier projects were being conducted and for 50% of the 
availability (100/200) only one other carrier project was being conducted. Each of the 
fifteen submarine availabilities are assigned a carrier impact factor which was calculated 
by multiplying 2 by the percentage of time that two carriers availabilities were underway 
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during the submarine’s availability and adding to that the percentage of time that only 
one carrier was underway during the submarine’s availability. Equation 5 displays the 
calculation for this example. 
(2x15%) + (50%) = 80 Carrier Impact Factor 
Equation 5. Sample Calculation for Carrier Impact Factor 
 
The carrier impact factor for each availability is then compared to the submarine 
availability’s number of days late as a percentage of planned availability length to 
investigate whether a larger carrier impact factor would result in a larger days late 
percentage. Table 16 and Figure 16 display the carrier impact factors and corresponding 
percentage of days late as a percentage of planned length for the submarine availabilities 
that occurred in Puget Sound shipyard between 2001 and 2011. 
USS HOUSTON (SSN 713) 7/8/04 730 48.1 38.49%
USS OHIO (SSGN 726) 12/23/05 1096 72.7 3.47%
USS JEFFERSON CITY (SSN 759) 8/1/04 394 91.2 35.28%
USS MICHIGAN (SSGN 727) 12/6/06 996 81.6 0.00%
USS COLUMBUS (SSN 762) 12/16/06 760 82.1 -0.13%
USS ALABAMA  (SSBN 731) 5/16/08 821 100.2 3.41%
USS HELENA (SSN 725) 5/27/06 60 83.7 73.33%
USS TOPEKA (SSN 754) 11/20/06 107 98.2 3.74%
USS HONOLULU (SSN 718) 11/30/08 760 102.2 0.00%
USS SAN FRANCISCO (SSN 711) 4/14/09 727 99.6 18.43%
USS ASHEVILLE (SSN 758) 9/11/07 91 129.3 12.09%
USS NEVADA (SSBN 733) 5/7/10 820 78 0.00%
USS JIMMY CARTER (SSN 23) 7/3/08 120 34.2 0.00%
USS JEFFERSON CITY (SSN 759) 12/20/08 110 100 0.00%
USS JIMMY CARTER (SSN 23) 12/23/10 303 87.3 3.63%











Table 16.   Carrier Impact Factors and Submarine Availability Lateness Statistics at 
Puget Sound Naval Shipyard 
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Figure 16.   Days Late Percentage as a Function of Carrier Impact Factor 
This plot does not provide clear evidence that carrier availabilities have a direct 
association with the lateness of submarine availabilities based on fifteen data samples. 
Further investigation can include a similar study of the submarine availabilities at 
Norfolk Naval Shipyard. Pearl Harbor and Portsmouth shipyards do not conduct carrier 
availabilities. Figure 17 displays the carrier impact factor as a function of availability 
length, which demonstrates clearly that longer availabilities do not have a tendency to 
negatively impact carrier availabilities. 
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Figure 17.   Carrier Impact Factor as a Function of Planned Availability Length 
I. IMPACT OF PERSONNEL RESOURCES ON AVAILABILITY 
LATENESS 
In this subsection, the relationship between the number of personnel resources 
available to work on an availability (measured in average man-days per month), with 
availability lateness is studied. The data provide values for BQWP, AQWP, availability 
start dates, availability end dates, and finally, the number of days the availability 
completes late. Two estimates are calculated for comparison: the planned number of 
man-days required to complete the work for each availability per month (BQWP/mo) and 
the actual number of man-days charged to each availability per month (AQWP/mo). The 
estimated planned number of man-days per month is calculated by dividing the BQWP 
by the planned availability length in months. The estimated actual number of man-days is 
calculated by dividing AQWP by the actual availability length in months. To determine 
actual availability lengths, the number of days between availability start and end is 
calculated and then divided by 30.42, which is the average number of days per month 
over a given year (365/12 = 30.42). Planned availability length is calculated as the 
number of actual days between start and end minus the number of days late and divided 
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by 30.42; the values obtained for actual and budgeted man-days per month are simply 
estimated averages over the availabilities of interest of the actual and planned man-days 
charged and earned on a monthly basis. 
Table 17 displays the mean number of man-days per month for late submarine 
availabilities and for on-schedule submarine availabilities; also displayed are the means 
for late carrier availabilities and on-schedule carrier availabilities. 
 
Late Availabilities On-Schedule Availabilities
Mean AQWP/Mo 11076.6 11778.57
Mean BQWP/Mo 11826.05 10634.39
Difference -749.45 1144.18
% Difference -6.34% 10.76%
Count 56 19
Late Availabilities On-Schedule Availabilities
Mean AQWP/Mo 27588.05 21813.46
Mean BQWP/Mo 28675.38 21464.38
Difference -1087.33 349.08





Table 17.   AQWP per Month and BQWP per Month Statistics for Late and Timely 
Availabilities 
The rows labeled ‘difference’ display the difference between AQWP per month 
and BQWP per month for both late availabilities and on-schedule availabilities. The row 
labeled ‘% difference’ is ‘difference’ as a percentage of ‘mean BQWP/Mo.’ The 
complete t-test data summaries are displayed in Appendix B. For both carriers and 
submarines, late availabilities on average charge less in man-days per month than the 
amount of man-days planned to complete the work. This possibly indicates an 
insufficient commitment of resources to the availability or an inflated BQWP that 
changed due to the addition of initially unexpected new work. As can be seen, the mean 
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BQWP per month for timely availabilities of both carriers and submarines tends to be less 
than the mean BQWP per month for late availabilities. Also important to note is that the 
charged amount of work per month for timely availabilities tends to exceed the planned 
amount of work per month, possibly indicating a commitment of a greater magnitude of 
resources to the project to ensure timeliness. To investigate further, late and on-schedule 
availabilities were broken down by availability type to ensure that similar availabilities 
are being compared. 
 
Late Availabilities On-Schedule Availabilities
Mean AQWP/Mo 9532.91 10848.72
Mean BQWP/Mo 11645.66 9981.85
Difference -2112.75 866.87
% Difference -18.14% 8.68%




Late Availabilities On-Schedule Availabilities
Mean AQWP/Mo 12913.11 13508.13
Mean BQWP/Mo 13332.12 11280.08
Difference -419.01 2228.05
% Difference -3.14% 19.75%




Late Availabilities On-Schedule Availabilities
Mean AQWP/Mo 4870.07 5102.19
Mean BQWP/Mo 4859.24 4571.23
Difference 10.83 530.96
% Difference 0.22% 11.62%




Late Availabilities On-Schedule Availabilities
Mean AQWP/Mo 15490.3 15216.44
Mean BQWP/Mo 14579.41 14309.07
Difference 910.89 907.37
% Difference 6.25% 6.34%
Num Avails 4 3
Submarine ERO (SSBN/SSGN)
 
Table 18.   AQWP per Month and BQWP per Month Statistics for Various 
Availability Types 
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Late Availabilities On-Schedule Availabilities
Mean AQWP/Mo 27889.65 23211.27
Mean BQWP/Mo 29932.22 23146.75
Difference -2042.57 64.52
% Difference -6.82% 0.28%
Num Avails 5 10
CARRIER PIA (CVN)
 
Table 19.   AQWP per Month and BQWP per Month Statistics for Various Availability 
Types 
The statistics in Table 19 (standard errors of the means are displayed in 
Appendix C) suggest that for all availability types, the mean AQWP per month tends to 
exceed the planned BQWP per month for timely availabilities. The statistics also suggest 
that for all availability types, with the exception of SSBN/SSGN engineering overhauls 
and SSN inactivation activities, the mean AQWP per month tends to be less than the 
planned BQWP per month for late availabilities, although the figures for overhauls and 
IAs are similar. Additionally, for all availability types, the average amount of resources 
needed to complete the work as represented by BQWP per month tends to be greater for 
late availabilities than timely availabilities. 
Taking on a different perspective will shed some light on the amount of personnel 
resources needed on a monthly basis to ensure a timely availability. In this summary, 
both the AQWP and BQWP of the availability are divided by the planned availability 
length in months. If the actual quantity of work performed is divided by the planned 
length, this can give an indication of the amount of work that would have been required 
on a monthly basis to finish the availability by the planned end date. Table 20 displays 
the results. 
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Late Availabilities On-Schedule Availabilities
Mean AQWP 14045.9 11493.6
Mean BQWP 11826.1 10634.4
Difference 2219.8 859.2
% Difference 18.77% 8.08%
Count 56 19
Late Availabilities On-Schedule Availabilities
Mean AQWP 31702.5 21727.4
Mean BQWP 28675.4 21464.4
Difference 3027.1 263





Table 20.   AQWP and BQWP divided by Planned Availability Length in Months 
For both late submarine and carrier availabilities, the actual average quantity of 
work performed per month is greater than the budgeted quantity of work performed per 
month by roughly 18% and 10% of the planned work, respectively. The on-schedule 
availabilities show a closer match between the man-days charged on a monthly basis and 
the planned number of monthly man-days needed. In conclusion, the monthly average 
man-days required to complete the availability tends to be greater than the planned 
monthly average by a larger amount for late availabilities than for timely availabilities. 
J. SUMMARY 
Shipyard performance data are summarized and displayed in various ways to gain 
insight into possible reasons contributing to availability lateness. The study is limited to 
data on 108 completed availabilities, resulting in a limited ability to produce statistically 
significant conclusions. The sections to follow analyze the impacts of a factor not yet 
covered in this study: work stoppages. 
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IV. AVAILABILITY EXECUTION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter summarizes the theory on network scheduling, describes work 
stoppages, and provides background information on availability execution processes. The 
intent of this chapter is to describe how work stoppages influence the execution of an 
availability.  
B. NETWORK SCHEDULING 
Shipyard project managers continually track and update all in-progress jobs 
during an ongoing availability, with the goal of finishing the availability on time. The 
scheduling (planning phase) and maintaining (execution phase) of the Availability Work 
Package (AWP, discussed in Chapter II) jobs is one of the most important activities to 
accomplish in the determination of how an availability’s resources should be integrated, 
especially when multiple jobs during a single availability are executing in parallel 
(Kerzner 2009). Due to the high complexity of the AWP and tight schedule deadlines, 
project managers are challenged to solve problems rapidly, efficiently, and with minimal 
impact to separate on-going jobs. As a result, scheduling techniques have been developed 
which allow project managers to mitigate the effects of unplanned events that arise 
during availability execution. Network modeling and critical path analysis are essential 
for project managers to understand in order to reveal the interdependencies between the 
on-going jobs and to help managers evaluate alternatives by answering questions such as 
how time delays will affect the availability’s completion (2009). 
1. Network Fundamentals 
A project is composed of a series of activities, determined by the management 
team, and constructed in such a way to achieve a desired objective (Blanchard and 
Fabrycky 2011). A network diagram is a pictorial representation of the events and 
activities that must be accomplished for a project to be deemed complete. Applying this 
definition and terminology to a CNO availability, events are the major milestones of the 
availability, for example, start availability (denoted SA00), complete undocking (denoted 
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UD00), and complete availability (denoted CA00). Network activities are the work 
package jobs, for example, engine clean and inspection, compartment painting, and fire 
pump maintenance. The construction of a network diagram allows the availability’s 
management team to identify all interdependencies that are present between events and 
activities (Kerzner 2009).  
As seen in Figure 18 of a network diagram, each activity consumes time and is 
represented by a single box. Activities are linked in a precedential order in order to show 
which activities must be finished before others can start. The arrows show activity 
precedence, and an activity is unable to start until all prior activities linked to it by the 
arrows are finished (2009). Each box is assigned a unique activity number, located at the 
lower left hand corner, which signifies precedence level.  
 
 
Figure 18.   Network Diagram Example (After Langford 2011) 
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All activities are assigned durations by estimating how long each activity will 
take, to include the time for all work to be completed plus preparation and waiting time. 
Realistic durations are essential to developing a credible, executable availability 
schedule. Work package job durations must be determined in a judicious, carefully 
considered manner. Job duration estimation reflects the manner in which the work will be 
performed as well as the historical performance of similar work (“Baseline Project 
Management Plan,” NAVSEA 07, 2009). The next step after duration estimation is to 
calculate the project schedule that provides the earliest and latest times at which each 
activity can start and finish. The earliest start time for an activity is based on the 
projected estimated start time and the duration estimation for preceding activities. 
Likewise, the earliest finish time is calculated by adding the given activity’s duration to 
the activity’s earliest start time (Kerzner 2009). The latest start and finish times is a 
backwards calculation, starting from the completion date, with the intention of 
determining the latest time at which an activity can take place without extending the 
completion date of the project (2009). The difference between the scheduled completion 
date and the total duration date is known as the slack time, commonly referred to as 
“float” in the Naval project management community. 
a. Float 
Float is an important measurement that allows an availability’s 
management team to determine how early or late an activity can start or finish. Float, as 
mentioned earlier, is the difference between the latest finish date and the earliest finish 
date. This difference will indicate whether the project will need to be accelerated or not, 
based on the three types of float, described as follows: 
• Positive float is the maximum amount of time the activities on the 
critical path can be delayed without jeopardizing the project’s 
completion date. 
• Negative float is the amount of time the activities on the critical 
path must be accelerated in order to meet the project’s completion 
date. 
• Zero float means the critical path does not need to be accelerated, 
nor can it be delayed (Langford 2011). 
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Float during a CNO availability is calculated on multiple levels: each job, 
each important milestone, and the availability completion’s float are all calculated. 
Negative float occurs when the planned or actual duration of the project extends beyond 
the planned end date. Negative float during the planning phase of an availability may 
signify an unreasonable amount of work is scheduled for the time allotted. Positive float 
experienced during the planning phase but negative float experienced during the 
execution phase can be attributed to job duration estimations and planned completion 
dates being highly optimistic and unrealistic (Kerzner 2009). NAVSEA currently directs 
all availability planning teams to add 30 extra days to the availability completion date to 
ensure that positive float is maintained during the availability’s execution (“AIM-NG 
Process Manual,” NAVSEA 04X, 2009).  
2. Scheduling Problems 
Problems arise during the execution of all availabilities that can impact the 
schedule by decreasing the amount of float. Scheduling problems include (but are not 
limited to) using unrealistic estimates for job durations, lack of personnel with requisite 
skills, over committing resources and having to share critical resources across several 
projects, frequent revisions to the primary work schedule, and unforeseen bottlenecks 
(Kerzner 2009). An availability work stoppage is a type of schedule problem and it is the 
primary factor that this research considers. The Theory of Constraints, which is a 
schedule improvement methodology discussed in the next section is applied to the 
availability work stoppage data in order to identify the impact on schedules due to work 
stoppages. 
C. THEORY OF CONSTRAINTS 
The Theory of Constraints (TOC) is the management technique, introduced by 
Eliyahu M. Goldratt, which seeks to improve the process of planning and execution. In 
Thomas B. McMullen’s 1998 book, Introduction to the Theory of Constraints 
Management System, he states, “the Theory of Constraints always ask, ‘What must 
something be if, in its category, it is inevitably to be the best that can be?’” TOC is 
applied using the proposed five-step process: 
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1. Identify the system’s constraints. 
2. Decide how to exploit the constraints. 
3. Fully support the decision by means of policies, processes, and resources. 
4. Remove the identified constraints. 
5. Return to Step 1. 
McMullen further discusses that regardless of the system, to which TOC is being 
applied, it is assumed that in order for TOC to be effective, the system must have a goal. 
The goal of the system has three requirements: its owners must determine the goal; it 
must be measureable; and it is subject to necessary conditions. In the case of a shipyard 
availability, the owners are the stakeholders, which include the availability’s planning 
and execution teams, the shipyard’s leadership, and NAVSEA. The measureable goal is 
to maintain and stay-on schedule. The third requirement, necessary conditions, is the 
procedures and laws of the shipyard that ensure the continuing operation of the 
availability. Examples of conditions include the shipyard safety requirements, technician 
qualifications, and workmanship quality. The primary goal of NAVSEA with respect to 
maintenance activities, regardless of system application, is in developing, delivering, and 
maintaining ships and systems on time and on cost for the United States Navy. Within the 
scope of TOC and this thesis, the NAVSEA goals, according to NAVSEA’s Strategic 
Business Plan for 2009–2013, are identified as follows: 
• Develop annual balanced, optimized, and integrated Maintenance and 
Modernization Execution Plans for shipyards. 
• Execute the Maintenance and Modernization Execution Plan and assess 
the results using metrics. 
Based on these specified NAVSEA goals, this thesis’ work stoppage analysis 
assumes that the primary goal of a shipyard availability is to complete the AWP on time, 
according to the planned schedule. This goal is applied to the availability as a whole and 
also to individual jobs themselves. It is further assumed that work stoppages are the TOC 
quantitative measurements used to determine a schedule constraint. 
A constraint is defined as anything that blocks the system from accomplishing its 
goal (McMullen 1998). During the execution phase of an availability, work package jobs 
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are started as dictated by the project schedule and the project manager. Once the job is 
started, it is classified as an active job and it is assumed that the job will finish on time 
and in the correct manner. If during the execution of an active job, a constraint is 
identified which prevents the job from being accomplished on schedule, a work stoppage 
is activated. The work stoppage is not closed until the constraint is resolved and work on 
the job is resumed. Constraints are organized into two categories: physical and policy. 
Physical constraints are classified as “scarce resources” whereas a policy constraint 
contains all other types of constraints. Work stoppages are classified based on eight 
categories, known as reasons. Table 20 organizes the work stoppage reasons by constraint 
type (1998):  
 
Physical Constraint Policy Constraint 
Material Technical Direction 




Table 21.   Work Stoppage Reasons Organized Based on Constraint Type 
1. Critical Chain Management 
Critical chain management is a methodology that addresses the need to get each 
project completed quickly and funnel more projects through the organization without 
additional resources (Kerzner 2009). A critical chain is defined as the longest chain of 
dependent events and/or activities where the dependency is either task or resource 
related. It is assumed from this definition that the longest chain of a project is most likely 
to negatively impact the overall duration of a project (2009). Stepping back to network 
fundamentals, a project’s network diagram is composed of activities in multiple parallel 
and series configurations, being executed simultaneously; all the paths of activities need 
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to be completed according to the schedule. Project managers rely on critical chain 
management to prioritize jobs and focus on the most crucial path of activities to be 
completed. The critical chain is the most time consuming path of activities during 
execution and is depicted as the longest path of activities in the network diagram; an 
example is displayed in Figure 19. 
TOC is used to specify the critical path (chain) of sequential jobs whose late 
completion most adversely affects the timely completion of the availability. The 
NAVSEA WebAIM-NG software assists the availability’s project manager in managing 
unexpected delays, in order to keep the critical path’s work progressing. 
 
 
Figure 19.   Critical Chain Colored in Red (After Langford 2011) 
D. WORK STOPPAGE 
The term “work stoppage” is defined as a delay experienced by a job during the 
execution phase of the availability. Specifically, a work stoppage occurs when work on a 
 54
job is delayed by more than one shift (“AIM-NG Process Manual,” NAVSEA 04X, 
2009). Work stoppages are categorized into eight reason codes (RSN): 
• Technical Direction (TD)–awaiting engineering resolution or technical 
direction (i.e., NAVSEA approved instructions) for work continuation. 
• Material (MAT)–delay in obtaining/receiving material. 
• Tooling (TL)–delay due to limited quantity of tools and manufacturing 
support of new special tooling. 
• Labor Resources (RSC)–shortage of manpower and other support services. 
• Work Control (WC)–administrative controls over system conditions 
needed to ensure safe work conditions are met prior to start of work 
• Workmanship/Rework (W)–delay due to rework 
• Interference/Coordination (IC)–delay due to multi-job priority levels, 
often due to space constraints and conditions. 
• Safety (SAF) –delay due to shipyard safety violation 
 
E. WEB AIM-NG SOFTWARE 
WebAIM-NG software is a project management tool, utilized for both planning 
and executing an availability, which assists the availability project team in planning, 
monitoring, and tracking all AWP jobs. This section describes the role of the software in 
the execution of shipyard availabilities. 
1. Execution Priorities 
Execution Priorities (EPR), as described in the AIM-NG Process Manual, is a 
logic process within the WebAIM software that develops and establishes shipyard 
priorities across all projects and availabilities within each shipyard. One of the main 
objectives of the EPR process is to identify on a daily basis the jobs that must be 
supported to maintain the non-stop execution of the critical chain in each availability. 
EPR tracks all activities and analyzes their impacts to the schedule. This is accomplished 
by evaluating activity durations, resource requirements, network sequencing, and known 
constraints in order to continually develop a list of priorities to aid the program manager 
in establishing a path forward. Figure 20 represents the EPR process and describes the 
required inputs, process logics, and the resulting outcomes. Depending in the daily 
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impacts and the continual evaluation and identification of critical jobs by the EPR, the 
availability may have a continually changing critical path.  
 
 
Figure 20.   EPR Process Diagram (After NAVSEA 04X 2009) 
EPR color-codes all activities in order to bring attention to the critical work, 
prioritizing based on each activity’s float, according to the following: 
• Red activities have fewer than 10 shifts of float and are on or near the 
Critical Chain. Completing Red activities late will likely prevent the 
project from meeting the key event associated with the activity. 
• Yellow activities are the next-most-important selection of activities 
relative to completing events. 
• Green activities more than 30 shifts of float. 
The color-coded activities are compiled and distributed into the Daily Priority List 
(DPL). The DPL lists the activities in priority number order, with the most critical 
activity needing support first. Availability teams use the DPL on a daily basis to identify 
the critical problems and develop/implement corrective actions with the goal of ensuring 
timely completion of work on of the critical chain. 
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F. SUMMARY 
Network models are the framework for the management of the availability 
execution process. By identifying the interdependencies between project activities, 
network models allow for the identification of the critical chain. As the longest chain, in 
terms of completion time, of connecting activities, the time to complete the jobs in the 
critical chain can impact the overall duration of the entire project. Due to the importance 
of this crucial chain of activities and the high complexity level of a shipyard availability, 
shipyards employ the WebAIM-NG software, which aids the availability team in 
identifying the critical chain and allows the team to support timely work completion of 
activities on this chain. 
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V. WORK STOPPAGE ANALYSIS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter displays statistical summaries of work stoppage data. The goal of 
this analytical chapter is to summarize the work stoppage data to display commonalities 
between availabilities and to investigate possible trends in work stoppages and predictors 
of availability lateness. In order to identify associations between work stoppages and 
availability lateness, the analysis assumes that work stoppages are the only reason for 
schedule delays; no other factors and influences are considered. 
B. RAW WORK STOPPAGE DATA 
Work stoppage data are provided, in Microsoft Excel format, by SEA 04X. The 
data are collected from all four public shipyards and include all availabilities in which a 
work stoppage was submitted. Table 21 provides a sample of the data. The work stoppage 
data include the following categories (NAVSEA 04X 2009): 
• Date – month, year, and day the activity’s work stoppage data was 
queried. 
• Shipyard Priority Number (SY Pri) – assigned number to the work 
stoppage entry based on all ongoing work, across all platforms in 
shipyard. Priority number directly reflects the urgency of the item 
regarding its impact on the availability’s critical chain 
• Project Identification (Proj ID) – three character alphanumeric code to 
classify availability identity (i.e., 21Q is the USS SEAWOLF Depot 
Modernization Period). 
• Key Event and Milestone (KE/MS) – key event or milestone to which item 
is directly related to. 
• Job Identification Number (JO-KO/SA#) – alphanumeric code to identify 
specific activity. 
• Start and Finish Dates – dates in which the activity started and plans to 
finish. The finish date is updated to reflect delays. 
• Remaining Duration (RDU) – remaining duration until activity is 
complete. Updated on a daily basis. 
• Calendar (Cal) – scheduling code that describes working shifts (i.e., 15 
represents one shift per day, five days per week). 
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Table 22.   Sample SEA 04X Work Stoppage Data 
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• Task Group Instruction Codes (TGI)–Technical Work Document (TWD) 
statuses. 
• Working Status (WKG)–activity status. 
• Cog Code–shipyard department responsible for resolving the work 
stoppage. 
• Reason Code (RSN)–eight work stoppage reasons (discussed in chapter 
IV). 
• Color Code (Clr)–identifies activity criticality and impact to the 
availability’s critical chain (discussed in Chapter IV). 
The work stoppage data are a weekly look at all active work stoppages for all on-
going availabilities. An active work stoppage is one in which a delay has been 
experienced in an activity and the administrative paper work has been submitted and is 
not yet resolved. Since work stoppages are continually submitted and cleared (resolved) 
on a daily basis, the collected work stoppage data does not account for every work 
stoppage experienced during an availability. This is due to the SEA 04X query rate. SEA 
04X conducts a query of the WebAIM software at the beginning of every week, usually 
every Monday; the results of this weekly query are displayed in the spreadsheet. In 
addition, the data provided does not give work stoppage submissions and clearing dates, 
preventing determination of work stoppage duration. Fortunately, duration can be roughly 
estimated based on the number of concurrent weeks a single work stoppage is observed. 
For example, if a work stoppage is observed once in the data set, it can be implied that its 
duration can be at least one day but no longer than 13 days. Similarly, if the same work 
stoppage, based on matching job numbers and reason codes, is present in the data for two 
consecutive weeks, then it can be assumed that its duration is at least eight days but no 
longer than 21 days. As a result of this large range of possible durations, the average of 
the extremities is assumed to be the work stoppage duration; an entry observed once is 
assumed to have a work stoppage duration of seven days, or one week. This data is 
analyzed for the purpose of identifying general trends on significant work stoppage 
delays. 
The data include multiple hull types, shipyard locations, and availability types, 
and is summarized in Table 22. 
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Total Number of Availabilities 32 
By Hull Type 
Number of Submarines 24 
Number of Carriers 6 
Number of Moored Training Ships 2 
By Shipyard 
Norfolk Naval 9 
Puget Sound 10 
Pearl Harbor 6 
Portsmouth 7 
By Availability Type 
DSRA 6 DEM 2 
EOH 6 IA 2 
PIA 3 MMP 1 
ERO 3 SRA 1 
PIRA 2 DMP 1 
RCD 2 CM 1 
DPIA 2 
Table 23.   High Level Work Stoppage Data Characteristics 
1. Description of the Data 
The work stoppage data obtained covers approximately 18 months, between 24 
May 2010 and 05 December 2011. During that time 32 availabilities had either started, 
completed, or both. Specifically, 14 availabilities had started prior to the collection 
window with nine of them finishing before the last collection date; 17 availabilities were 
still in-progress after the last collection date; and six availabilities had started and 
completed within the collection window. Figure 21 depicts the availability lengths and 
the collection window. The thick black box represents the data collection timeframe. The 
graph is color coded with red representing in-progress availabilities at time of the last 
data collection date, yellow representing availabilities that started prior to the start of data 







































Figure 21.   Actual Availability Lengths Compared with Data Collection Timeframe
 62
Of the 32 availabilities, only the six availabilities that started and completed 
inside the data collection timeframe are used for the analysis of work stoppage. The 
availabilities that started prior to the collection timeframe are considered incomplete due 
to the unavailable work stoppage data prior to collection. The availabilities currently in 
progress are also determined to be incomplete because the outcomes, in regard to 
schedule duration and future work stoppage submittals, are unknown. Even though the 
current availabilities have estimated completion dates, unanticipated delays and future 
work stoppages may affect the end date, and therefore these availabilities are excluded 
from the analysis. Even though this criterion limits the availability’s statistical population 
to a small sample size, it is the purpose of the criterion to only analyze complete and 
known availability data sets. The six availabilities for the work stoppage analysis are 
displayed in Table 23 and are considered the historical data for which trends and 








Days             
Late (+) / Early (-)
NNSY PIA CVN EISENHOWER 182 58
PSNSY SRA CVN G WASHINGTON 119 26
PHNSY DSRA SSN COLUMBUS 177 19
PSNSY MMP SSGN MICHIGAN 106 14
PSNSY PIA CVN JOHN C. STENNIS 184 1
NNSY CM SSN NORFOLK 148 -5  
Table 24.   Work Stoppage Analysis Availability Summary 
2. Data Organization 
The work stoppage data in its provided form contains individual entries of active 
work stoppages based on the query date. The current form is able to provide insight on 
the quantity of active work stoppages per query; however it does not adequately provide 
insight on entire work stoppage durations and job delays. Instead of manually sorting and 
compiling the original seventy thousand lines of work stoppage data, a Microsoft Excel 
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macro, a customizable series of commands, is capable of efficiently sorting and 
compiling the data into the user’s requested form. The data from the six availabilities is 
separated into six individual data files before the macro is run.  
The Microsoft Excel macro is composed of an “if-then” statement that extracts the 
job identification number, work stoppage reason, and date from individual work stoppage 
entries. A comparison between two entries is performed to determine if the job 
identification number and work stoppage reason are the same, and if the entries are one 
week apart. One week is considered six, seven, or eight days to account for fluctuations 
in time between queries, due to days off for federal holidays. For this research, it is 
assumed that if a job is present on multiple consecutive weeks and it has the same work 
stoppage reason throughout, then that is considered a single work stoppage with the 
duration in weeks equal to the number of consecutive entries. If all three criterion are not 
met, the work stoppage entry is considered a single duration. Using Table 21 as an 
example, the macro will result in the sample output in Table 24. Job ending in “S08” 
experienced an interference/coordination (IC) work stoppage at two different times in the 








3621Q02802-A01 TD 2 
36SRB83101-R11 MAT 1 
3635N84005-S08 IC 1 
3635N84005-S08 IC 1 
Table 25.   Sample Macro Output 
In order to quantify work stoppage durations, the length estimation discussed 
earlier is utilized. As stated, each work stoppage entry is estimated to have a duration 
range between one day and 13 days, with an average of seven days, or one week. This 
average of one week is taken as an assumption in which to classify a work stoppage 
entry. Similarly, a work stoppage with two or three consecutive entries is delayed two or 
 64
three weeks, respectively. This assumption may not be precise in terms of actual duration, 
however it can provide general information on trends and commonalities. 
The analysis further assumes that all jobs within the availability are executed 
according to the planned duration. Availability planning data, which includes the planned 
(estimated) job durations and the network diagram of sequential and concurrent jobs, is 
not available for analysis and therefore the planning durations must be assumed to be 
accurate. In part, it is further assumed that if a job is delayed and will not meet the 
planned completion date, a work stoppage has been submitted to document the delay. 
C. WORK STOPPAGES BY LENGTH  
Each of the six availabilities is split into two data sets. The first data set includes 
all the work stoppage data, regardless of the color-coded criticality. These data allow for 
the identification of any significant factors causing availability lateness as it relates to the 
overall execution of the availability. The second data set includes only the work 
stoppages on or near the critical path, identified as “red” in the entry’s color code. The 
EPR suggests failure to act on a “red” labeled work stoppage will likely result in missing 
an important milestone or key event. As a result, the identified critical work stoppages are 
analyzed separately. 
Each data set is organized based on work stoppage reason and by duration. This 
organization allows the mean duration length, standard deviation, and standard error of 
the mean to be determined for each work stoppage reason. Appendix C contains 
statistical summaries of the data sets of the six availabilities. 
1. Complete Work Stoppage Data 
The mean lengths of work stoppages for each reason are displayed in Table 25. 
Standard errors of the means are displayed in Appendix C. The six availabilities are 
sorted in descending order of lateness with the expectation of observing higher mean 
work stoppage lengths associated with the later availabilities. Unfortunately, no apparent 
simple association between mean length per work stoppage reason and availability 
lateness can be made. 
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MAT IC TD TL SAF W WC RSC Total WS
EISENHOWER PIA 
(58 Days Late)
2.06 2.12 1.84 1.00 1.53 2.00 2.35 1.84 1.99
WASHINGTON SRA 
(26 Days Late)
1.83 1.24 1.50 2.50 1.00 2.20 1.57 1.33 1.65
COLUMBUS DSRA 
(19 Days Late)
1.40 1.86 1.41 1.39 0.00 1.50 1.77 1.29 1.56
MICHIGAN MMP     
(14 Days Late)
1.61 1.70 1.60 2.00 2.00 0.00 1.50 1.60 1.66
STENNIS PIA        
(1 Days Late)
1.88 2.18 1.76 1.36 2.00 3.00 2.20 1.67 1.97
NORFOLK CM       
(5 Days Early)


























Table 26.   Work Stoppage Reason Mean Length Summary 
Due the high variety and limited replications of hull and availability types in the 
sample, the influence of these factors as it relates to average work stoppage length cannot 
be determined. In order to provide some insight, a comparison is conducted between the 
EISENHOWER PIA and the STENNIS PIA, similar hull and availability type, using a 
student t-test with the null hypothesis stating the difference between the mean lengths of 
all work stoppages is zero. Comparing the mean length of the availability’s total work 
stoppages (Total WS in Table 25) results in the failure to reject the null hypothesis. This 
result may signify that lengths per work stoppage reason are not a factor in availability 
lateness, since the compared availabilities differ significantly on number of days late but 
do not differ based on mean length. Although it would be nice to rule out work stoppage 
lengths as a contributor to lateness, the method of work stoppage length estimation is 
surely an error contributor. The criticality of the work stoppages may also be a factor in 
explaining the failure in finding an association. This data is composed of work stoppages 
both on (red color-coded) and off (green and yellow color-coded) the critical chain and 
therefore the less critical work stoppages may be influencing the mean lengths of the 
work stoppage reasons. This hypothesis is further considered in the statistics analysis 
section of red color-coded work stoppages. 
Although these data do not show availability lateness association, they do 
describe the dynamic of each availability with respect to work stoppages. By ranking 
each work stoppage reason’s mean length relative to the other reasons within the same 
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availability, it is concluded that resource work stoppages (RSC) are continually in the 
lower half of the rankings, signifying a shorter mean stoppage length. Conversely, 
interference/coordination work stoppages (IC) are in the top three, signifying some of the 
longest mean delays, five out six times. 
 
MAT IC TD TL SAF W WC RSC
EISENHOWER PIA
(58 Days Late)
3 2 6 8 7 4 1 5
WASHINGTON SRA
(26 Days Late)
3 7 5 1 8 2 4 6
COLUMBUS DSRA
(19 Days Late)
5 1 4 6 8 3 2 7
MICHIGAN MMP     
(14 Days Late)
4 3 5 1 1 8 7 5
STENNIS PIA        
(1 Days Late)
5 3 6 8 4 1 2 7
NORFOLK CM       








Table 27.   Relative Work Stoppage Duration Rankings 
2. Red Color-Coded Work Stoppage Data 
Table 27 summarizes the average work stoppage lengths by reason for work 
stoppages identified as critical. Standard errors of the means are displayed in Appendix 
C. Similar to the complete work stoppage data analysis, there is no apparent simple 
association between availability lateness and average work stoppage length. The same 
student 
t-test is performed, comparing total work stoppage mean length between the 
EISENHOWER and STENNIS PIAs, and again results in the failure to reject the null 
hypothesis that the work stoppage mean lengths are the same. 
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MAT IC TD TL SAF W WC RSC Total WS
EISENHOWER PIA 
(58 Days Late)
1.34 1.55 1.34 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.37 1.29 1.40
WASHINGTON SRA 
(26 Days Late)
1.39 1.30 1.19 0.00 1.00 1.33 1.43 1.33 1.31
COLUMBUS DSRA 
(19 Days Late)
1.22 1.45 1.07 1.60 0.00 1.00 1.88 1.15 1.32
MICHIGAN MMP     
(14 Days Late)
1.47 1.55 1.23 2.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.48
STENNIS PIA        
(1 Days Late)
1.22 1.59 1.21 1.00 0.00 1.25 1.57 1.43 1.42
NORFOLK CM       
(5 Days Early)


























Table 28.   Red Color-Coded Work Stoppage Reason Mean Length Summary 
The average length and the standard deviation (not shown but displayed in 
Appendix C) of the red-color coded data are smaller than the complete data set’s average 
length and standard deviation. The smaller values represent a shorter mean delay and a 
tighter empirical distribution of lengths. As the highest prioritized jobs, the red coded 
work stoppages are better supported and the delays are quickly resolved to ensure 
continuous flow of the critical chain. This is attributed to the Daily Priority List (DPL) 
and the project team’s continual focus on the list. 
Ordering the reasons for work stoppages using mean lengths of the stoppages 
results in the rankings displayed in Table 28. Interference/coordination as well as work 
control (WC) stoppages are ranked in the top two positions, signifying longest mean 
length, in over half of the availabilities analyzed, and in the top 50% of the rankings five 
of six times. These are the largest groupings observed and are worth noting. 
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MAT IC TD TL SAF W WC RSC
EISENHOWER PIA
(58 Days Late)
3 1 4 6 6 6 2 5
WASHINGTON SRA
(26 Days Late)
2 5 6 8 7 3 1 3
COLUMBUS DSRA
(19 Days Late)
4 3 6 2 8 7 1 5
MICHIGAN MMP     
(14 Days Late)
3 2 4 1 5 8 5 5
STENNIS PIA        
(1 Days Late)
5 1 6 7 8 4 2 3
NORFOLK CM       








Table 29.   Relative Red-Color Coded Work Stoppage Duration Rankings 
D. WORK STOPPAGES BY QUANTITY 
Each of the eight reasons’ total number of work stoppages is tallied and the 
percent of the availability’s total work stoppages for each reason is calculated. Table 29 
displays the percentages for red color-coded work stoppages. The tallied quantities for 
both complete and red color-coded data sets are displayed in Appendix D. Although no 
direct association is observed between percentage of work stoppages by reason and 
availability lateness, material (MAT), interference/coordination, and technical direction 
(TD) are consistently the three highest percentages for which red color-coded work 
stoppages are experienced. Similar percentages are observed in the complete work 
stoppage data set, with the same three work stoppage reasons having the highest 
percentages.  
 
MAT IC TD TL SAF W WC RSC
EISENHOWER PIA 
(58 Days Late)
27.6% 33.9% 24.6% 0.3% 1.4% 1.4% 5.5% 5.3%
WASHINGTON SRA 
(26 Days Late)
37.5% 11.4% 35.2% 0.0% 1.1% 3.4% 8.0% 3.4%
COLUMBUS DSRA 
(19 Days Late)
14.0% 38.6% 31.6% 2.2% 0.0% 0.4% 7.5% 5.7%
MICHIGAN MMP     
(14 Days Late)
34.4% 53.6% 6.8% 0.5% 1.0% 0.0% 1.6% 2.1%
STENNIS PIA        
(1 Days Late)
22.1% 49.1% 16.8% 0.9% 0.0% 1.8% 6.2% 3.1%
NORFOLK CM       
(5 Days Early)




















Table 30.   Percentage of Availability’s Total Red Color-Coded Work Stoppages 
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E. WORK STOPPAGES BY TIME-IN-AVAILABILITY 
As an availability progresses from the planning and preparation phase, to the 
execution phase, and finally to the testing phase, the management team’s focus is always 
shifting. The framework of the planning phase is known as the left-to-right sweep. This 
sweep aims to ensure all lessons learned and best practices from past and ongoing 
availabilities are incorporated into the planning process (NAVSEA 07 2009). During this 
phase, the support work (to include prefabrication and manufacturing work) is the focus 
to ensure the infrastructure and support services are ready for the execution phase. The 
execution phase is where the majority of the production work, known in the shipyard 
industry as “wrench turning,” takes place. The focus of the execution phase is to ensure 
the continuous forward movement of the work package jobs through the prioritization of 
jobs. The testing phase occurs at the end of the availability, with the focus of assessing 
the quality of the work performed.  
The change in phases may be reflected in changes in reasons for work stoppages. 
The work stoppage data for the six availabilities is organized based on time-in-
availability that the work stoppage occurred with the intent to observe the shifts in the 
focuses, as well as to identify any associations between work stoppages and availability 
lateness. Each availability is divided into three time segments: time before the start of the 
availability, the planned duration, and the time after the planned completion date of the 
availability. The planned availability duration is further segmented into tenths. SEA04X 
starts collecting work stoppage data eight weeks prior to availability start; support work 
normally starts during this eight week period. The planned availability duration 
(availability’s planned completion date minus start date) is split into tenths to account for 
the difference in availability lengths and to allow for comparison on the same time scale. 
The work stoppages are organized by reason and by the time they are experienced during 
the availability. This time is determined based upon the availability’s start date and the 
query date of the work stoppage entry. The complete and red color-coded data sets 
organized by time-in-availability are displayed in Appendix E. 
Figure 22 displays the number of work stoppages by reason for the COLUMBUS 
(SSN 762) DSRA as a function of time of occurrence during its availability. The shift in 
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the focus from the planning and preparation phase to the execution phase is observed in 
















































































Figure 22.   Quantity of MAT, IC, and TD Work Stoppages by Time-in-Availability 
Prior to the start of the COLUMBUS DSRA, material and technical direction 
work stoppages are responsible for the largest numbers of delays. This can be attributed 
to the support and prefabrication work being performed before the production work 
commences. During the first 30% of the availability, there is a gradual decrease in 
material work stoppages and a rapid increase in interference/coordination stoppages. This 
is due to the focus shift from planning/preparation to execution, where production work is 
on the rise and the on-going jobs are interfering with one another. At this point in the 
availability, the management team must prioritize jobs and assign precedence in order to 
keep work moving. The shift in focus to execution is further amplified by the continual 
increase in technical direction work stoppages, with the bulk of these experienced during 
the first 30% of the availability. 
The complete data set of the COLUMBUS DSRA provides the clearest example 
of observing this shift. Although the shift from planning to execution is not visually 
apparent in every availability, the number of interference/coordination work stoppages in 
all six of the analyzed availabilities tend to be small at the beginning and end of the 
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availability and with the majority located in 30%–70% range of the availability. 
Graphical representations with respect to material, interference/coordination, and 
technical direction, for all historical availabilities are displayed in Appendix E. 
1. Pre-availability Work Stoppage Ratio 
Comparison of the number of work stoppages experienced prior to availability 
start and the number of work stoppages experienced during the execution phase in the 
complete data set suggests that availabilities that are close to completing on-time 
experience a relatively smaller number of work stoppages before the availability starts 
than during it. As a result of this suggestion, ratios are calculated by dividing the number 
of work stoppages experienced prior to the start of the availability by the total number of 
work stoppages experienced up until to the desired point in time during the availability. 
For example, to calculate this pre-availability work stoppage ratio for the first 50% of the 
availability, the number of work stoppages prior to availability start is divided by the sum 
of the total number of work stoppages experienced up until the 50% point, to include the 
work stoppages prior to the availability start. Table 30 shows this ratio (in percentage 







MICHIGAN MMP    
(14 Days Late)
STENNIS PIA        
(1 Days Late)
NORFOLK CM      
(5 Days Early)
10% 66.03% 60.66% 30.86% 93.80% 28.68% 0.00%
20% 50.14% 38.76% 22.33% 35.44% 12.49% 0.00%
30% 37.16% 20.22% 14.30% 28.47% 7.86% 0.00%
40% 28.15% 16.41% 12.95% 13.99% 5.22% 0.00%
50% 23.63% 12.98% 11.31% 9.78% 3.57% 0.00%
60% 20.14% 11.34% 11.00% 7.59% 2.73% 0.00%
70% 16.41% 11.30% 9.92% 6.54% 2.36% 0.00%
80% 15.10% 10.65% 9.75% 5.88% 2.26% 0.00%
90% 13.85% 10.49% 9.48% 5.82% 2.23% 0.00%
100% 13.56% 10.18% 9.04% 5.56% 2.22% 0.00%
















Table 31.   Complete Data Set Pre-Availability Work Stoppage Ratio 
Beginning at the 50% point in the availability and onward, a trend is observed 
with the higher percentages of pre-availability work stoppages associated with the later 




point of the availability length versus their respective number of days late. Similar trend 























Percentage of Work Stoppages Experienced Prior to Start of Availability Compared to 
Work Stoppages Experienced Up Until 50% of the Availability 
 
Figure 23.   Pre-Availability Work Stoppage Ratio at 50% Point of Planned Availability 
The approximate linear relationship displayed in Figure 23 provides the first 
indication of a positive association between numbers of work stoppages and availability 
lateness. The association is attributed to the number of work stoppages experienced 
during the planning/preparation phase as compared to the execution phase of the 
availability; the more work stoppages that are experienced during the 
planning/preparation phase, the more likely the availability will not be completed on 
time. This association, while it may provide information on availability lateness, must be 
understood with two caveats. The first is of course the limited amount of provided data. 
A similar comparison with a data set containing the true number of work stoppages is 
recommended for association validation. Secondly, SEA 04X did maintain consistency 
by starting data collection eight weeks prior to the availability start; however, without any 
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additional information on the length of the planning phases, it can only be assumed that 
all planning phases and availability preparations were conducted during similar lengths of 
time. 
 It can further be assumed without any additional information on the planning and 
execution phases of these historical availabilities, that delays experienced prior to the 
start of an availability, during the planning phase, affect the ability of the execution phase 
to be carried out as planned. This seems plausible since the majority of the work 
accomplished prior to the start of the availability is in preparation for the future 
production work. If these supporting jobs are not ready at the start of the availability, jobs 
in the execution phase will be missing the supportive infrastructure required for 
completion. 
F. SUMMARY 
The analysis of the work stoppage data provides observations of general trends for 
the six historical availabilities. In addition, by comparing the number of work stoppages 
experienced prior to the start of the availability to the number experienced during the 
availability, it is found that more work stoppages during the planning/preparation stage of 
an availability is associated with a higher likelihood that the availability will not be 
completed on time. An in-depth study using a larger sample of availabilities is 
recommended to verify this observation. 
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VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE STUDIES 
A. SUMMARY OF STUDIES 
Shipyard performance data are summarized and displayed in various ways to gain 
insight into possible reasons behind availability lateness. Studies that have been 
conducted are:  
• Comparison of the percentage of availabilities that are late at the four 
different shipyards to determine possible differences between shipyards.  
• Comparison of the percentage of submarine availabilities that are late and 
the percentage of carrier availabilities that are late across all four 
shipyards to investigate if the different platforms types have similar 
likelihoods of finishing late.  
• Cost performances of late and on-schedule availabilities are compared. 
• Comparison between availabilities of different lengths with regard to the 
number of days late as a percentage of scheduled length.  
• Investigation of possible association between the days late percentage of 
availabilities and the number of simultaneous availabilities underway in 
the shipyard; and changes in the days late percentage across different time 
periods from 2003 to 2011.  
• Availability lateness in Puget Sound and Portsmouth is studied for projects 
with various durations during inclement weather months to investigate 
possible seasonal impacts.  
• The days late percentage of submarine availability in Puget Sound is 
studied for possible associations between the number of simultaneous 
carrier availabilities underway and submarine availability lateness.  
• The number of planned and spent man-days per month are compared for 
late and on-schedule availabilities.  
This study is limited to data on 108 completed availabilities. The smallness of the 
sample size and apparent improvement in availability lateness over time limit the ability 
to state “statistically significant” conclusions. However, the results are suggestive and 
suggest areas for further investigation. 
The work stoppage analysis investigates the interactions and effects of delays 
during an execution of an availability. Although the provided work stoppage data is only 
a weekly snapshot of the number, reason, and duration of work stoppages submitted, 
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trends with respect to availability lateness and commonalities between all types of 
availabilities are discovered. The collection of work stoppage data is composed weekly of 
work stoppage entries between 24 May 2010 and 05 Dec 2011. Each entry is compared to 
one another in order to group similar entries in terms of job number and work stoppage 
reason. This organization method is the foundation for the work stoppage research and 
allows for the analysis to examine work stoppages in terms of the work stoppage lengths, 
quantities, and time-in-availability. 
B.  ADDRESSING THE CONCERNS OF THE SUBJECT MATTER 
EXPERTS 
The following analyses are conducted to study possible associations between lack 
of skilled personnel and availability lateness: a comparison of estimated number of man-
days spent per month expended during the availability and the estimated planned number 
of man-days per month, utilizing values given of AQWP and BQWP respectively for 
each completed availability; and a comparison of CP values for late and timely 
availabilities.  
CP ratios can be an indication of the skill level of those getting the work done. If 
the actual amount of work charged to complete the availability, AQWP, is less than the 
planned amount of work to complete the availability, BQWP, this may be indicative of a 
skilled labor force completing work in a timelier fashion than the initially set standard. If 
AQWP is greater than BQWP, then it is possible that the workforce is not as skilled as 
initially thought and the work to be performed takes longer than initially expected, 
affecting availability lateness. If personnel resources are not available for certain time 
periods during availabilities, perhaps due to other availabilities temporarily drawing from 
the resource pool, then the AQWP per month should be less than the BQWP per month if 
certain work cannot be accomplished due to the personnel absence. The comparison of 
AQWP per month and BQWP per month shows the general differences between late and 
timely availabilities possibly resulting from differing commitments of skilled personnel 
resources to the project. Results show that late availabilities tend to charge less for work 
per month than is initially planned, whereas timely availabilities tend to charge more for 
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work per month than is initially planned. This can be an indication that late availabilities 
are not committing the resources required. 
Data pertaining specifically to new work added to an availability was not 
collected and an analysis of such data is not included in this study. However, 
comparisons of the BQWP per month for late availabilities and the BQWP per month for 
timely availabilities can possibly reflect an impact of new work since the results show 
that late availabilities have a higher mean BQWP per month than timely availabilities, 
reflecting a greater number of man-days required to complete the project work.  
An initial hypothesis is that late availabilities tend to require more overtime work 
because the lack of adherence to the day to day schedule starting from the beginning of a 
project will result in an overload of work towards the end. A comparison is made of the 
mean overtime percentages of late availabilities and on-schedule availabilities to see if 
they are statistically significantly different. Results show that there is no statistically 
significant difference. 
C.  CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The intention of this study is to find differences between late and timely 
availabilities, and to display availability data in different ways in order to discover unseen 
associations between certain factors and availability lateness. The research questions 
addressed are: 
• Can a statistical analysis of the planned versus actual quantity of work 
performed provide information on availability lateness? 
• Are there one or more public shipyards that are statistically different than 
the rest in terms of availability planning and execution performance? 
• Does the quantity and/or length of work stoppages affect the execution 
phase of an availability? 
• Can an analysis of historical work stoppage data identify possible 
predictors for schedule lateness? 
Since this study covers a small number of availabilities completed in recent years, 
most statistical analyses lacked a sufficient number of data samples needed make 
“statistically significant” conclusions. However, the following list summarizes the 
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findings of this study and provides areas for further investigation that can aid in the effort 
to reduce either the number of late availabilities or the availability’s days late percentage. 
1. Carrier Availabilities Finish On-Time More Often Than Submarine 
Availabilities 
Puget Sound Naval Shipyard and Norfolk Naval Shipyard completed more 
availabilities on time than Pearl Harbor and Portsmouth, but there is no statistically 
significant difference in the percentages of late availabilities between any of the yards 
based on the number of availabilities studied. However, there is a statistically significant 
difference in the percentages of late carrier availabilities and late submarine availabilities, 
providing evidence that carrier availabilities have a greater probability of finishing on 
time than submarine availabilities.  
2. On Time Availabilities Result in a Higher Cost Performance Ratio 
Comparison of the CP ratios of late and on-schedule availabilities, suggest that 
late availabilities have a mean CP ratio of 0.87 and on-schedule availabilities have a 
mean CP ratio of 0.95. Less than 25 percent of late availabilities have a CP ratio of 0.95 
or higher. It is reasonable to expect timely availabilities to have a CP ratio close to unity. 
However, it is important that the budgeted quantity of work performed accurately reflects 
the required number of man-days to complete the work in the availability. An area of 
future investigation can involve the analysis of work items often found in availability 
work packages to investigate if the amount of work charged for those work items equals 
the budgeted amount of man-days allocated for that work. 
3. Shorter Availabilities Have a Larger Days Late Percentage  
The days late percentage of an availability is defined as the number of days it is 
late as a percentage of the planned availability length. The days late percentage is 
significantly higher for short availabilities with planned lengths of 200 days or fewer. 
Short availabilities that are late have a mean days late percentage of 42 percent, whereas 
late availabilities longer than 200 days have mean days late percentages of 14 to 16 
percent. Results also show that the mean number of days late for short availabilities is not 
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statistically significantly different from the mean number of days late for medium length 
availabilities ranging from 200 to 400 days in length. This means that short and medium 
length availabilities often have comparable number of days late, even though short 
availabilities have a mean length of 131 days and medium length availabilities have a 
mean length of 332 days. An area for further investigation should involve an analysis of 
short availabilities to determine means to improve their planning process in order to 
reduce the mean number of days late and with it the days late percentage. 
4. No Association Between the Number of Availabilities Underway in a 
Shipyard and Availability Lateness 
The mean days late percentage is calculated for availabilities in years 2005 
through 2009 at each shipyard. During these years, the number of simultaneous 
availabilities in a shipyard ranges from three to nine. The results suggest that more 
availabilities underway in a shipyard does not result in a larger days late percentage for 
those availabilities.  
5. Decreasing Days Late Percentage at Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard 
The mean days late percentage of availabilities underway in Pearl Harbor Naval 
Shipyard in the 2003 to 2005 time period is roughly 79%, roughly 16% in the 2006 to 
2008 time period, and roughly 10% in the 2009 to 2011 period. The days late percentage 
of the availabilities at Puget Sound and Portsmouth naval shipyards also show a 
downward trend after 2006. The mean days late percentage of the availabilities underway 
at Norfolk Naval Shipyard is consistent between 2003 and 2011 at around ten percent. An 
area of future investigation can be to find the reasons behind the significant decrease in 
the days late percentage at Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard from 2003 to 2011. 
6. No Association Between Submarine Availability Days Late Percentage and 
Concurrent Underway Carrier Availabilities 
An analysis is conducted to compare the days late percentage of every completed 
submarine availability at Puget Sound Naval Shipyard with a calculated carrier impact 
factor. A carrier impact factor gives a means of weighting the number and duration of 
carrier availabilities that occurred at Puget Sound during the submarine’s availability. 
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The larger the carrier impact factor, the larger the number and/or durations of 
simultaneous carrier availabilities. The initial hypothesis is that submarines that 
possessed a higher carrier impact factor have higher days late percentage, based on the 
assumption that carrier availabilities take priority over submarine availabilities and draw 
from the resource pool. The results show no association between the days late percentage 
and the carrier impact factor. 
7. Late Availabilities Charge Less in Man-Days per Month Than the Planned 
Earned Value of Work per Month 
Two estimates are calculated for this study: the actual quantity of work performed 
for an availability, divided by the actual monthly length of that availability, and the 
budgeted quantity of work performed for the availability, divided by the planned length 
in months of that availability. The means of these two estimates are compared separately 
for completed availabilities that finished late and availabilities that finished on time. 
Results show that the mean AQWP per month is less than the mean BQWP per month for 
late availabilities and greater for timely availabilities. This is possibly an indication that 
not as many personnel resources, whether a limited quantity or novice in skill level, are 
committed to late availabilities as the work requires and that more personnel resources, 
an abundance in quantity or veteran in skill level, are committed to timely availabilities 
than the plan states. Results also show that the mean BQWP per month for late 
availabilities is greater than the mean BQWP per month for timely availabilities by an 
amount of 1,192 man-days per month for submarine availabilities and 7,211 for carrier 
availabilities. Since the BQWP is a dynamic figure through the execution phase of a 
project, a greater mean BQWP for late availabilities can be the result of a greater 
magnitude of new and unexpected work added to those availabilities than that of timely 
availabilities. An area for further investigation can include an analysis of the transfer of 
personnel resources between availabilities across all shipyards and over specific time 
periods to examine the impacts on availability AQWP figures. Another area for further 
investigation involves the analysis of new work profiles of individual availabilities to 
determine the impact on BQWP figures. 
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8. No Association between Quantity or Length of Work Stoppage and 
Availability Lateness 
The conjecture at the beginning of this analysis is that larger work stoppage 
lengths and larger numbers of work stoppage would be associated with the late running 
availabilities. Unfortunately, neither the mean length per work stoppage reason nor the 
total number of work stoppages appear associated with availability lateness. The small 
sample size of 6 availabilities may contribute to this finding. A better understanding of 
the work stoppages’ effect on availability lateness can be accomplished if all work 
stoppage data is recorded; that is, all submitted work stoppages are recorded, 
accompanied by the true durations, and the availability’s WebAIM schedule is provided. 
This information, when analyzed simultaneously, will allow for the work stoppage’s 
impact on the schedule’s float to be better quantified. 
Although the number and mean length of work stoppages is not associated with 
availability lateness, the analysis did show material, interference/coordination, and 
technical direction are the most likely reasons for work stoppage. From an availability 
manager’s perspective with the goal of minimizing delays, this analysis offers the 
following recommendation: ensure that material lead times are proactively managed and 
the planning of work item integration and scheduling is highly detailed and thorough. 
9. On-Time Availabilities Have Relatively Smaller Numbers of Work Stoppages 
Prior to Availability Start 
A display of the number of work stoppages occurring by time-in-availability 
suggests that on-time availabilities tend to experience smaller numbers of work stoppages 
prior to the start of the availability. Correspondingly, the late finishing availabilities tend 
to experience higher numbers of work stoppages prior to and during the early stages of 
the availability. Furthermore, organizing work stoppages by occurrence time-in-
availability results in an approximate linear association between availability days late and 
the ratio of work stoppages experienced prior to the availability start to the total number 
of work stoppages experienced during the entire availability. This ratio, in percentage 
form, is larger for the later availabilities, signifying a higher number of work stoppages 
prior to availability start than during it, compared to the on-time availabilities. This 
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finding is based on data from six completed availabilities and should be further examined 
using data from additional availabilities. However, even with the limited data, this 
association introduces the question as to why work stoppages experienced prior to the 
start of the availability affect the outcome of the availability. Without any additional 
knowledge as to the planning and execution phases of the analyzed availabilities, it is 
presumed that the work stoppages prior to the availability start are associated with the 
support and prefabrication work that takes place in preparation for the availability’s 
execution. As a result of the delay in the preparation work, the production work planned 
during the execution phase may not have the required support services in place to execute 
on time. 
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APPENDIX A: TOP LEVEL SHIPYARD DATA 
A. SHIPYARD AVAILABILITY COMPLETION DATA 
Days Late Frequency
<-10 1
-9  to 0 14
1 to 10 3
11 to 20 1
21 to 30 1
31 to 40 5
41 to 50 2
51 to 60 2
61 to 70 0
71 to 80 0
81 to 90 2
91 to 100 1
More 2  
Table 32.   Norfolk Naval Shipyard Availability Completion Based on Days Late 
Days Late Frequency
< -10 1
-9 to 0 3
1 to 10 2
11 to 20 2
21 to 30 3
31 to 40 0
41 to 50 1
51 to 60 2
61 to 70 0
71 to 80 2
81 to 90 2
91 to 100 0
More 5  




 < -10 3
-9 to 0 0
1 to 10 2
11 to 20 2
21 to 30 2
31 to 40 0
41 to 50 0
51 to 60 3
61 to 70 1
71 to 80 1
81 to 90 1
91 to 100 1
More 5  
Table 34.   Portsmouth Naval Shipyard Availability Completion Based on Days Late 
Days Late Frequency
 < -10 0
-9 to 0 15
1 to 10 2
11 to 20 4
21 to 30 2
31 to 40 1
41 to 50 1
51 to 60 0
61 to 70 1
71 to 80 0
81 to 90 0
91 to 100 0
More 4  
Table 35.   Puget Sound Naval Shipyard Availability Completion Based on Days Late 
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B. SHIPYARD GANTT CHARTS 
The Gantt charts are color-coded with the blue bars representing submarine 
availabilities, the red representing carrier availabilities, the green representing LHD 
availabilities, the purple representing MTS availabilities, and the yellow representing an 
AS availability. 
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Figure 24.   Availabilities at Norfolk Naval Shipyard from 2005 to 2009 
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Figure 25.   Availabilities at Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard from 2005 to 2009 
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ID Project ID Start Finish
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Figure 26.   Availabilities at Portsmouth Naval Shipyard from 2005 to 2009 
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Figure 27.   Availabilities at Puget Sound Naval Shipyard from 2005 to 2009 
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APPENDIX B: AQWP AND BQWP STATISTICAL COMPARISON 
RESULTS  
Two-sample t-tests, assuming unequal variances, are conducted to compare the 
budgeted quantity of work planned (BQWP) per month (based on the planned duration) 
against the actual quantity of work planned (AQWP) per month (based in terms of both 
planned duration and actual duration). 
A. AQWP AND BQWP PER MONTH FOR LATE AVAILABILITIES 




Hypothesized Mean Difference 0  
df 14  
t Stat -0.429422794  
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.337075382  
t Critical one-tail 1.761310115  
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.674150765  
t Critical two-tail 2.144786681   
   




Hypothesized Mean Difference 0  
df 110  
t Stat -1.303453007  
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.097570845  
t Critical one-tail 1.658824188  
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.19514169  
t Critical two-tail 1.981765221   
Table 36.   T-test Results Comparing Means of AQWP/Month (Actual Duration) and 









Hypothesized Mean Difference 0  
df 13  
t Stat -0.974157853  
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.173878592  
t Critical one-tail 1.770933383  
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.347757183  
t Critical two-tail 2.160368652   
   




Hypothesized Mean Difference 0  
df 102  
t Stat -3.313716773  
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.000637503  
t Critical one-tail 1.659929976  
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.001275006  
t Critical two-tail 1.983495205   
Table 37.   T-test Results Comparing Means of AQWP/Month (Planned Duration) and 















B.  AQWP AND BQWP PER MONTH FOR TIMELY AVAILABILITIES 
On-Time Carriers BQWP/Month (planned) AQWP/Month (actual) 
Mean 21464.37741 21813.45841 
Variance 46401735.52 52498999.07 
Observations 16 16 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0  
df 30  
t Stat -0.140406252  
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.444638755  
t Critical one-tail 1.697260851  
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.889277511  
t Critical two-tail 2.042272449   
   
On-Time Submarines BQWP/Month (planned) AQWP/Month (actual) 
Mean 10634.38914 11778.56585 
Variance 16285689.68 19246088.21 
Observations 19 19 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0  
df 36  
t Stat -0.836683947  
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.204145016  
t Critical one-tail 1.688297694  
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.408290032  
t Critical two-tail 2.028093987   
Table 38.   T-test Results Comparing Means of AQWP/Month (Actual Duration) and 
















On-Time Carriers BQWP/Month (planned) AQWP/Month (planned) 
Mean 21464.37741 21727.44338 
Variance 46401735.52 51890943.57 
Observations 16 16 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0  
df 30  
t Stat -0.106136335  
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.458090364  
t Critical one-tail 1.697260851  
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.916180728  
t Critical two-tail 2.042272449   
   
On-Time Submarines BQWP/Month (planned) AQWP/Month (planned) 
Mean 10634.38914 11493.5883 
Variance 16285689.68 19202764.84 
Observations 19 19 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0  
df 36  
t Stat -0.628676321  
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.266764923  
t Critical one-tail 1.688297694  
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.533529847  
t Critical two-tail 2.028093987   
Table 39.   T-test Results Comparing Means of AQWP/Month (Planned Duration) and 


























Late Sub Avails 11076.6 411.4 11826.1 401.7 
On-Time Sub Avails 11778.6 1006.5 10634.4 925.8 
Late Carrier Avails 27588.1 1720.8 28675.4 1857.5 
On-Time Carriers 21813.46 1811.4 21464.4 1703.0 
Late Sub DSRA 9532.9 539.1 11645.7 679.2 
On-Time Sub DSRA 10848.7 641.8 9981.5 526.9 
Late Sub ERO 15490.3 1592.8 14579.7 1370.0 
On-Time Sub ERO 15216.4 330.6 14309.1 650.4 
Late Sub DMP 12913.1 457.4 13332.1 567.0 
On-Time Sub DMP 13508 1278.8 11280.1 1091.7 
Late Sub IA 4870.1 191.3 4859.2 225.1 
On-Time Sub IA 5102.2 418 4571.2 318.6 
Late Carrier PIA 27889.7 1838.9 29932.2 2806.8 












Late Sub Avails 14045.9 536.1 11826.1 401.7 
On-Time Sub Avails 11493.6 1005.3 10634.4 925.8 
Late Carrier Avails 31702.5 2491.2 28675.4 1857.5 
On-Time Carriers 21727.4 1800.9 21464.4 1703.0 
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APPENDIX C: WORK STOPPAGE DATA BY LENGTH 
The tables are organized with the columns representing the eight reasons for work 
stoppage and the rows are the estimated number of work stoppages for each duration 
measured in weeks; the durations are in units of weeks. The table is populated with the 
number of work stoppages observed with respect to work stoppage reason and the 
number of consecutive entries (labeled as duration). 
A. COMPLETE WORK STOPPAGE DATA SETS 
MAT IC TD TL SAF W WC RSC Total WS
1 379 423 479 16 61 33 55 94 1540
2 142 186 150 0 1 9 22 36 546
3 49 86 77 0 2 3 20 15 252
4 36 53 35 0 1 4 6 8 143
5 19 26 8 0 0 0 2 1 56
6 21 14 14 0 3 3 1 3 59
7 12 11 5 0 1 0 2 3 34
8 2 4 5 0 0 0 1 0 12
9 5 5 6 0 1 0 0 1 18
10 3 3 0 0 0 0 1 0 7
11 0 2 3 0 0 0 2 0 7
12 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 2
13 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
14 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
15 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
16 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
19 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 670 816 782 16 70 53 113 161 2681
2.06 2.12 1.84 1.00 1.53 2.00 2.35 1.84 1.99
1.83 1.79 1.52 0.00 1.57 1.94 2.21 1.40 1.73











Mean Length of 
Stoppage (weeks)
Standard Deviation
Standard Error of Mean  
Table 41.   EISENHOWER (CVN 69) PIA 
 96
MAT IC TD TL SAF W WC RSC Total WS
1 71 17 86 1 1 5 9 4 194
2 23 3 19 0 0 3 3 2 53
3 11 1 8 0 0 0 1 0 21
4 6 0 5 1 0 0 1 0 13
5 5 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 7
6 2 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 3
7 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 2
8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
19 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 119 21 120 2 1 10 14 6 293
1.83 1.24 1.50 2.50 1.00 2.20 1.57 1.33 1.65
1.31 0.53 0.99 1.50 0.00 1.72 0.90 0.47 1.16















Table 42.   GEORGE WASHINGTON (CVN 73) SRA 
MAT IC TD TL SAF W WC RSC Total WS
1 81 94 156 12 0 1 21 19 384
2 31 41 36 5 0 1 4 3 121
3 5 21 16 1 0 0 2 2 47
4 1 9 2 0 0 0 2 0 14
5 1 6 1 0 0 0 0 0 8
6 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 2
7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
8 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
9 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
10 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
19 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 119 173 213 18 0 2 30 24 579
1.40 1.86 1.41 1.39 0.00 1.50 1.77 1.29 1.56
0.69 1.29 0.83 0.59 0.00 0.50 1.76 0.61 1.04











Mean Length of 
Stoppage (weeks)
Standard Deviation
Standard Error of Mean  
Table 43.   COLUMBUS (SSN 762) DSRA 
 97
MAT IC TD TL SAF W WC RSC Total WS
1 66 89 18 0 1 0 4 4 182
2 21 37 6 1 0 0 1 0 66
3 7 10 6 0 1 0 1 0 25
4 2 9 0 0 0 0 0 1 12
5 4 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 6
6 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
7 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
8 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
19 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 101 149 30 1 2 0 6 5 294
1.61 1.70 1.60 2.00 2.00 0.00 1.50 1.60 1.66
1.08 1.16 0.80 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.76 1.20 1.09
0.11 0.10 0.15 0.00 0.71 0.00 0.31 0.54 0.06
Mean Length of 
Stoppage (weeks)
Standard Deviation












Table 44.   MICHIGAN (SSGN 727) MMP 
MAT IC TD TL SAF W WC RSC Total WS
1 166 257 187 12 4 4 24 81 735
2 94 128 70 1 0 8 13 38 352
3 46 66 25 0 0 1 1 10 149
4 16 32 15 0 0 0 1 5 69
5 5 22 3 1 0 0 0 1 32
6 4 14 5 0 1 0 1 2 27
7 1 7 3 0 0 0 1 1 13
8 1 2 1 0 0 0 1 0 5
9 1 2 1 0 0 1 1 0 6
10 0 4 0 0 0 0 1 0 5
11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
12 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
13 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
19 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 334 535 310 14 5 15 44 138 1395
1.88 2.18 1.76 1.36 2.00 3.00 2.20 1.67 1.97
1.21 1.71 1.30 1.04 2.00 3.27 2.22 1.08 1.52










Mean Length of 
Stoppage (weeks)
Standard Deviation
Standard Error of Mean
Work Stoppage Reason
 
Table 45.   JOHN C STENNIS (CVN 74) PIA 
 98
MAT IC TD TL SAF W WC RSC Total WS
1 29 40 23 0 0 5 1 2 100
2 3 5 0 0 0 0 1 0 9
3 0 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 4
4 0 2 0 0 0 1 0 0 3
5 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
19 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 32 50 25 0 0 6 2 2 117
1.09 1.34 1.24 0.00 0.00 1.50 1.50 1.00 1.26
0.29 0.76 0.86 0.00 0.00 1.12 0.50 0.00 0.72










Mean Length of 
Stoppage (weeks)
Standard Deviation
Standard Error of Mean
Work Stoppage Reason
 







B. RED COLOR-CODED WORK STOPPAGE DATA SETS 
MAT IC TD TL SAF W WC RSC Total WS
1 135 147 121 2 9 9 27 25 475
2 32 45 25 0 0 0 4 8 114
3 6 14 9 0 0 0 3 1 33
4 1 7 2 0 0 0 1 0 11
5 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 4
6 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
7 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
12 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
19 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 177 217 158 2 9 9 35 34 641
1.34 1.55 1.34 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.37 1.29 1.40
0.80 1.15 0.74 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.76 0.52 0.90















Table 47.   EISENHOWER (CVN 69) PIA 
MAT IC TD TL SAF W WC RSC Total WS
1 24 8 25 0 1 2 5 2 67
2 6 1 6 0 0 1 1 1 16
3 2 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 4
4 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
19 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 33 10 31 0 1 3 7 3 88
1.39 1.30 1.19 0.00 1.00 1.33 1.43 1.33 1.31
0.74 0.64 0.40 0.00 0.00 0.47 0.73 0.47 0.61















Table 48.   GEORGE WASHINGTON (CVN 73) SRA 
 100
MAT IC TD TL SAF W WC RSC Total WS
1 26 63 68 3 0 1 8 12 181
2 5 16 3 1 0 0 5 0 30
3 1 5 1 1 0 0 2 1 11
4 0 2 0 0 0 0 2 0 4
5 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
19 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 32 88 72 5 0 1 17 13 228
1.22 1.45 1.07 1.60 0.00 1.00 1.88 1.15 1.32
0.48 0.88 0.30 0.80 0.00 0.00 1.02 0.53 0.72















Table 49.   COLUMBUS (SSN 762) DSRA 
MAT IC TD TL SAF W WC RSC Total WS
1 48 70 11 0 2 0 3 4 138
2 13 22 1 1 0 0 0 0 37
3 1 4 1 0 0 0 0 0 6
4 1 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 6
5 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
6 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
7 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
19 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 66 103 13 1 2 0 3 4 192
1.47 1.55 1.23 2.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.48
1.02 1.09 0.58 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.02















Table 50.   MICHIGAN (SSGN 727) MMP 
 101
MAT IC TD TL SAF W WC RSC Total WS
1 40 76 33 2 0 3 11 4 169
2 9 18 4 0 0 1 1 3 36
3 1 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 12
4 0 3 0 0 0 0 1 0 4
5 0 2 1 0 0 0 1 0 4
6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
9 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
19 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 50 111 38 2 0 4 14 7 226
1.22 1.59 1.21 1.00 0.00 1.25 1.57 1.43 1.42
0.46 1.15 0.69 0.00 0.00 0.43 1.24 0.49 0.96















Table 51.   JOHN C STENNIS (CVN 74) PIA 
MAT IC TD TL SAF W WC RSC Total WS
1 13 24 13 0 0 2 2 2 56
2 0 3 0 0 0 1 0 0 4
3 0 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 4
4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
19 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 13 30 14 0 0 3 2 2 64
1.00 1.30 1.14 0.00 0.00 1.33 1.00 1.00 1.19
0.00 0.64 0.52 0.00 0.00 0.47 0.00 0.00 0.53















Table 52.   NORFOLK (SSN 714) CM 
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APPENDIX D: WORK STOPPAGE DATA BY QUANTITY 
The work stoppage entries are counted and sorted into the appropriate reason 
categories. 
A. COMPLETE WORK STOPPAGE DATA SETS 
MAT IC TD TL SAF W WC RSC WS Total
EISENHOWER PIA 
(58 Days Late)
670 816 782 16 70 53 113 161 2681
WASHINGTON SRA 
(26 Days Late)
119 21 120 2 1 10 14 6 293
COLUMBUS DSRA 
(19 Days Late)
119 173 213 18 0 2 30 24 579
MICHIGAN MMP     
(14 Days Late)
101 149 30 1 2 0 6 5 294
STENNIS PIA        
(1 Days Late)
334 535 310 14 5 15 44 138 1395
NORFOLK CM       
(5 Days Early)















Table 53.   Quantity of Work Stoppages 
B. RED COLOR-CODED WORK STOPPAGE DATA SETS 
MAT IC TD TL SAF W WC RSC WS Total
EISENHOWER PIA 
(58 Days Late)
177 217 158 2 9 9 35 34 641
WASHINGTON SRA 
(26 Days Late)
33 10 31 0 1 3 7 3 88
COLUMBUS DSRA 
(19 Days Late)
32 88 72 5 0 1 17 13 228
MICHIGAN MMP     
(14 Days Late)
66 103 13 1 2 0 3 4 192
STENNIS PIA        
(1 Days Late)
50 111 38 2 0 4 14 7 226
NORFOLK CM       
(5 Days Early)















Table 54.   Quantity of Red Color-Coded Work Stoppages 
 
 104
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK  
 105
APPENDIX E: WORK STOPPAGES BY TIME-IN-AVAILABILITY 
The work stoppages are sorted based on reason and by time during the availability in 
which experienced. The figures corresponding to each table display the number of 
material (MAT), interference/coordination (IC), and technical direction (TD) work 
stoppages against the time-in-availability. 
A. COMPLETE WORK STOPPAGE DATA SETS 
MAT IC TD TL SAF W WC RSC Total WS
Prior to SA00 123 21 197 0 0 0 4 1 346
0%-10% 30 73 56 1 2 2 2 12 178
10%-20% 45 29 77 1 1 0 8 5 166
20%-30% 61 79 72 2 0 5 3 19 241
30%-40% 50 62 83 1 52 1 15 34 298
40%-50% 41 84 70 0 2 2 7 29 235
50%-60% 36 121 50 8 0 10 10 19 254
60%-70% 104 139 90 2 0 7 24 25 391
70%-80% 52 78 31 0 3 1 7 10 182
80%-90% 62 81 40 0 1 4 14 5 207
90%-100% 15 18 4 1 1 9 4 1 53
































































































Figure 28.   EISENHOWER (CVN 69) PIA 
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MAT IC TD TL SAF W WC RSC Total
Prior to SA00 11 3 13 0 0 0 0 1 28
0%-10% 9 2 5 0 0 0 1 1 18
10%-20% 11 2 12 0 0 0 0 1 26
20%-30% 20 10 28 1 1 3 2 1 66
30%-40% 14 0 17 0 0 0 0 1 32
40%-50% 21 3 14 1 0 2 3 1 45
50%-60% 14 0 12 0 0 3 2 0 31
60%-70% 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
70%-80% 8 0 5 0 0 2 0 0 15
80%-90% 1 0 2 0 0 0 1 0 4
90%-100% 1 0 5 0 0 0 2 0 8








































































































MAT IC TD TL SAF W WC RSC Total
Prior to SA00 15 4 16 3 0 0 11 2 51
0%-10% 41 23 32 7 0 1 6 4 114
10%-20% 26 7 29 1 0 0 0 0 63
20%-30% 17 51 49 3 0 1 4 3 128
30%-40% 1 11 20 1 0 0 0 4 37
40%-50% 7 24 16 3 0 0 4 3 57
50%-60% 1 5 7 0 0 0 0 0 13
60%-70% 5 18 20 0 0 0 2 5 50
70%-80% 1 4 3 0 0 0 0 1 9
80%-90% 3 4 6 0 0 0 2 0 15
90%-100% 0 17 7 0 0 0 1 1 26








































































































MAT IC TD TL SAF W WC RSC Total
Prior to SA00 10 2 4 0 0 0 0 0 16
0%-10% 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
10%-20% 15 7 3 0 0 0 2 1 28
20%-30% 1 6 4 0 0 0 0 0 11
30%-40% 12 34 8 0 1 0 2 1 58
40%-50% 21 20 5 1 0 0 1 1 49
50%-60% 16 26 3 0 0 0 0 2 47
60%-70% 7 24 1 0 1 0 1 0 34
70%-80% 15 10 2 0 0 0 0 0 27
80%-90% 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 3
90%-100% 1 12 0 0 0 0 0 0 13










































































































MAT IC TD TL SAF W WC RSC Total
Prior to SA00 4 0 12 0 0 1 7 7 31
0%-10% 13 19 27 0 0 0 10 8 77
10%-20% 32 48 40 2 1 0 1 16 140
20%-30% 21 62 38 1 1 2 1 20 146
30%-40% 47 62 54 4 2 1 3 26 199
40%-50% 61 126 51 2 1 5 9 19 274
50%-60% 57 108 61 2 0 6 5 30 269
60%-70% 52 89 21 3 0 0 4 10 179
70%-80% 38 10 2 0 0 0 2 2 54
80%-90% 7 10 4 0 0 0 1 0 22
90%-100% 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 3








































































































MAT IC TD TL SAF W WC RSC Total
Prior to SA00 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0%-10% 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
10%-20% 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
20%-30% 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
30%-40% 9 12 9 0 0 1 0 0 31
40%-50% 5 13 7 0 0 2 0 0 27
50%-60% 11 8 3 0 0 1 1 0 24
60%-70% 3 9 3 0 0 0 0 0 15
70%-80% 0 5 1 0 0 0 1 1 8
80%-90% 4 3 2 0 0 2 0 1 12
90%-100% 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0











































































































MICHIGAN MMP    
(14 Days Late)
STENNIS PIA        
(1 Days Late)
NORFOLK CM      
(5 Days Early)
10% 66.03% 60.66% 30.86% 93.80% 28.68% 0.00%
20% 50.14% 38.76% 22.33% 35.44% 12.49% 0.00%
30% 37.16% 20.22% 14.30% 28.47% 7.86% 0.00%
40% 28.15% 16.41% 12.95% 13.99% 5.22% 0.00%
50% 23.63% 12.98% 11.31% 9.78% 3.57% 0.00%
60% 20.14% 11.34% 11.00% 7.59% 2.73% 0.00%
70% 16.41% 11.30% 9.92% 6.54% 2.36% 0.00%
80% 15.10% 10.65% 9.75% 5.88% 2.26% 0.00%
90% 13.85% 10.49% 9.48% 5.82% 2.23% 0.00%
100% 13.56% 10.18% 9.04% 5.56% 2.22% 0.00%
















Table 61.   Pre-availability Work Stoppage Ratio 
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B. RED COLOR-CODED WORK STOPPAGE DATA SETS 
MAT IC TD TL SAF W WC RSC Total WS
Prior to SA00 24 8 36 0 0 0 0 0 68
0%-10% 5 4 2 0 0 1 0 1 13
10%-20% 7 3 9 0 0 0 0 0 19
20%-30% 10 8 4 0 0 0 1 2 25
30%-40% 7 23 13 0 9 0 1 6 59
40%-50% 6 20 4 0 0 0 1 6 37
50%-60% 9 20 30 2 0 1 1 9 72
60%-70% 22 55 15 0 0 0 2 2 96
70%-80% 24 29 18 0 0 0 2 5 78
80%-90% 31 25 16 0 0 2 9 3 86
90%-100% 2 6 1 0 0 1 3 0 13






































































































MAT IC TD TL SAF W WC RSC Total WS
Prior to SA00 5 3 4 0 0 0 0 1 13
0%-10% 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 2
10%-20% 0 1 4 0 0 0 0 0 5
20%-30% 5 5 4 0 1 3 1 1 20
30%-40% 3 0 2 0 0 0 0 1 6
40%-50% 5 1 4 0 0 0 2 0 12
50%-60% 7 0 9 0 0 0 1 0 17
60%-70% 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
70%-80% 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
80%-90% 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
90%-100% 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0












































































































MAT IC TD TL SAF W WC RSC Total WS
Prior to SA00 4 2 4 0 0 0 3 0 13
0%-10% 6 6 5 1 0 0 2 2 22
10%-20% 4 4 4 0 0 0 0 0 12
20%-30% 8 15 18 0 0 1 3 1 46
30%-40% 0 4 5 1 0 0 0 1 11
40%-50% 4 13 6 3 0 0 4 2 32
50%-60% 2 4 1 0 0 0 0 0 7
60%-70% 1 11 12 0 0 0 3 5 32
70%-80% 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 4
80%-90% 1 2 2 0 0 0 1 0 6
90%-100% 0 18 7 0 0 0 1 1 27












































































































MAT IC TD TL SAF W WC RSC Total WS
Prior to SA00 6 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 8
0%-10% 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
10%-20% 5 4 2 0 0 0 1 1 13
20%-30% 1 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 5
30%-40% 4 20 1 0 0 0 0 1 26
40%-50% 18 10 3 1 0 0 1 0 33
50%-60% 14 30 3 0 1 0 0 2 50
60%-70% 6 11 1 0 1 0 1 0 20
70%-80% 10 4 1 0 0 0 0 0 15
80%-90% 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
90%-100% 1 13 0 0 0 0 0 0 14









































































































MAT IC TD TL SAF W WC RSC Total WS
Prior to SA00 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0%-10% 1 3 1 0 0 0 1 0 6
10%-20% 2 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 5
20%-30% 1 5 6 0 0 0 1 0 13
30%-40% 3 7 2 1 0 0 0 0 13
40%-50% 6 33 5 0 0 3 2 0 49
50%-60% 7 25 12 0 0 1 3 3 51
60%-70% 16 25 9 1 0 0 2 4 57
70%-80% 7 3 1 0 0 0 2 0 13
80%-90% 2 6 0 0 0 0 1 0 9
90%-100% 4 1 2 0 0 0 2 0 9









































































































MAT IC TD TL SAF W WC RSC Total WS
Prior to SA00 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0%-10% 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
10%-20% 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
20%-30% 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
30%-40% 3 5 5 0 0 0 0 0 13
40%-50% 0 6 3 0 0 0 0 0 9
50%-60% 6 6 1 0 0 1 1 0 15
60%-70% 1 8 3 0 0 0 0 0 12
70%-80% 0 3 0 0 0 0 1 1 5
80%-90% 3 2 2 0 0 2 0 1 10
90%-100% 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0












































































































MICHIGAN MMP    
(14 Days Late)
STENNIS PIA        
(1 Days Late)
NORFOLK CM      
(5 Days Early)
10% 83.95% 86.67% 37.14% 100.00% 0.00% 0.00%
20% 68.00% 65.00% 27.66% 38.10% 0.00% 0.00%
30% 54.40% 32.50% 13.98% 30.77% 0.00% 0.00%
40% 36.96% 28.26% 12.50% 15.38% 0.00% 0.00%
50% 30.77% 22.41% 9.56% 9.41% 0.00% 0.00%
60% 23.21% 17.33% 9.09% 5.93% 0.00% 0.00%
70% 17.48% 17.33% 7.43% 5.16% 0.00% 0.00%
80% 14.56% 17.11% 7.26% 4.71% 0.00% 0.00%
90% 12.30% 17.11% 7.03% 4.68% 0.00% 0.00%
100% 12.01% 17.11% 6.13% 4.32% 0.00% 0.00%
















Table 68.   Pre-availability Work Stoppage Ratio 
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